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McLaughlin: What Has the Supreme Court Taught, Part II

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7g.

WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT TAUGHT?
Part Il
James Audley McLaughlin*

~

In a dusty corner of my attic I recently discovered on an old·•
yellowed manuscript, which was printed in rather new letters, a
little parable that seems relevant to an understanding of the role '
of the Supreme Court in our democracy and, moreover, seems ..t
fitting starting point for a discussion of, and a search for, a legitimate;
role for the Court, i.e. one that is compatible with democracy,
This discussion and search include criticism of the role the Court
has actually played in the recent past and the "faulty teaching" tha~ ·:
has resulted, all of which will bring us back to Lance v. Board of
Education of Roane County," discussed in Part I.

-AParableAdam is a man of indeterminate age. He has been sitting in his
study, in sober and reflective contemplation as to how he will litit{/
his life. His old servant, Samuel, has just entered.
Adam: Samuel, my good and faithful servant, I have jii.sl ·
written a resolution as to how I shall live my Zife. It is a list of pre:,;\
cepts, worked out through reason, here in the quiet of my study, a.f
though, Lord knows, with much fevered debate with myself. t:
think, if I keep to them, they give me the best rusurance I coul/1
want of a long and happy life. (Hands Samuel the Resolution.)
Samuel: I see, yes, well very commendable.
Adam: Now these precepts, by which I hope to govern mj\
future conduct, are a list of things I cannot do. Of course being'
a reasonable and experienced man, I know that under stress an{!':
momentary passion, such resolutions are often broken even by th{
most resolute of men. But I'm most determined to avoid such lapst~
and that's why I've called you in. I have made you a sort of guarditir{
of my Resolution. In fact I have provided for it as part of the Reso!~~
lion, itself. You know I think of you as my wisest old servant. You're.'
very learned in the law, which I have a particularly great respec(
"'Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.i\. ,
1962, Ohio State University; J.D., 1965, Ohio State University.
..,
1 170 S.E.2d 783 (W,Va. 1969) cert. granted sub nom. Gordon v. France, 3S.,;
U.S.LW. 3388 (U.S. April 6, 1970) (No. 1244).
.
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} '. for, and you have often been my advisor and even, as you know, my
·· inspiration.
·
Samuel: (mildly puzzled) That's very flattering but what
· does this Guardianship entail?
·
Adam: Well you know by long habit and custom I frequently
tum to you to effect many of my actions.
Samuel: Yes, go on.
Adam: In the future you are to refuse such cooperation when
in your opinion you feel my action violates my Resolution. You
are absolutely to refuse such cooperation for thirty days and if at
the end of that time I have not reformed or amended my Resolution, you should persist in refusing cooperation. All that I have
written into my Resolution.
Samuel: I see, and I suppose you want me to write out my
reasons for refusing cooperation, as has always been my custom in
' other matters.
Adam: Exactly., that "writing out" your reasons is one of the
chief reasons y01lre so respected. You see, a lot of the language in
my Resolution I learned from you, and_I'll be frank and admit I
!,,ave a less sophisticated understanding of its meaning, implications
·. .and ramifications than you, my great teacher.
Samuel: (smiling patronizingly) Yes, I suppose.
Adam: The thirty days will allow me time to return to the
quiet of my study, to reevaluate my Resolution calmly and dispassionately in the light of my own experience and what you have
taught me. I can take stock of my life and how I want to live it, If
I have reformed or amended my Resolution, then- you must be
guided by such changed Resolution, and determine its meaning for
future cooperation.
Samuel: But if you haven't amended it I'm to persist in my
refusal.
Adam: (now seeming to note the patronizing smile) You do
realize,_ of course, that they are my resolutions - even though learned
from yo·u. (rather emphatically) A n-d if I should persist, despite your
teaching, in a course of conduct you say is proscribed by my Resolution I should expect you, being wise as well as learned and good
(Adam gives Samuel an imploring but vaguely threatening look) , to
reexamine your own interpretation in light of my contrary one as
manifest by my persistence. I know you're subtle enough to understand that.
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Samue1: (musing) Hmmm.
S
Adam: But I do want you to be objective and disintere#¢iitJ·
in ?our judgment. ~n fact, as part of ~he Reso~ution itself, I've•
pointed you Guardian of my Resolution for life and with pay t,,ot
to be diminished.
. );
Samuel: But Adam, my boy, what power will I have tor¢~)
cooperation or to keep you to your past practice as to the nee,i
my cooperation? In short, how can I keep you to your Resolu,.ti¢ri)
when you have never given me a gun or made me privy to y,q,h/
bank account?
. ·; J
Adam: I've no intent of making you my master, Samuel; bui
only to retain you as my servant - with a special, perhaps ~~i
exalted, role.
·.·.·.·'

'4p~·

Joi'

·[

!

Samuel: (still perplexed) Ah, but what a puny guardian. ,t.oJ_
make of me; most of the real Resolution-keeping depends an ;i~u'.
How can I save you from yourself?
Adam: You can't. But you think me a reasonable man, dti"'r/
you, Samuel? I mean generally and usu.ally. You often told m_d; s
in the past - that's why I decided I cou.ld be master. (now
cajoling, perhaps afraid he will lose his esteemed servant) flu
you've always been my most trusted teacher and now even mot.~: sq
Why, you can teach me what I meant by some of my precepts/f.1/
used words that you have taught me. Certainly you'll knottrl'
what they mean in some future situation. Why, I've learne4 l(ij
that words sometimes change meaning over time. And the ide'l4j t
goals, th.at my precepts embody! I learned them from you--. ri;t
least a good many of them. I mean these precepts to last a lifeJipif
They're fairly general - only guides - some general "can't d~'si
And I don't claim my reason to be perfect - even in the qui.~t
my study. Perhaps you'll think it best to ignore some - I'll tfu.i.
you in this - but please make me understand why. Maybe....- (~~
then Adam reflects for a moment) why maybe somtime you'ti; te{
me - that a "cannot do" is a "must do". I suppose it is pP$sfb
though I can't conceive of it - considering you only 1coop¢ta
with my doing. And you are my servant.
· ' . ·\
Samuel: (his face has been slowly brightening and now lj.11:s • .•
confident glow) Why certainly. Sometimes when you do $q11i
thing - I'll say, "But if you want my cooperation - you'll haf!f .
do it such and such a way consistent with your Resolution.'" 14~.
that's a sort of "must do".
· ··

q,4i~tI

9.

o
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Adam: See, you're teaching me already. You know, Samuel,
your cleverness and ingenuity sometimes frighten me. I'm glad you
are too weak to lift a gun and a total loss with money. In any event
you're certainly not clever or strong enough to get either guns or
money. In that regard you're certainly the least dangerous of my
servants.
Samuel: But I can protect you from those overweening other
servants and agents of yours.
Adam: Nonesense, Samuel, I'll protect you from them if
there's any protecting to be done, and don't you forget it. (Raising
his eyebrows wryly) That is, as long as I want to; (warming more to
the taunt) as long as you make me want to - wise old friend.
Samuel: (muttering half-aloud) Some Resolution. A bunch of
"cannot do's." How can I keep him good and make him great? Thrry
should be. plain "do's" and "don'ts." "Cannot do's" without "must
do's'' is feckless and fatuous.
Adam: Stop that muttering, old man. The idea of "must do's''
is fevering your brain. The idea of what I shall do I purposely left
to day-to-day consideration. Maybe s.ome day I'll sit down and
think it all through again and put it in some "must do's". And I'll decide when and where. And I'll get a better guardian for "do's' than
you, my poor, weak old fellow. Do you understand'!
·
Samuel: (Getting up - somewhat -crest-fallen, preparing to
leave - muttering to himself) This poor Adam - always was slow doesn't understand about "drls" and "don'ts'. How can J ever make
him great'!
Adam: Great'! Just keep me good, Samuel, I'll become great
on my own. You can teach me a little about greatness but that's
all. Hold me to my Resolutions as best you can - others will help
me to greatness. Having your hoary old head shake "no" and your
'weathered old finger point me to the quiet of my study from time
to time - that's all I ask of you. If I go crazy it'll be on my own. If
I become completely lost to reason, you are much too puny to save
me. I'll throw you and all resolutions out.
Samuel: And if you are not - you have no real need of me.
Adam: No. No. I love and venerate you, my dear, learned old
hand. You've long been my teacher and guide. You were once my
i, friend and interceder. You, more than anyone, raised me to be
· master. That I won't let you undo. But I want you to continue as
my teacher, my trusted servant, and now as Guardian against my
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momentary lapse from reason. Respect my Resolution; remind rrt.&:
of it; teach me more about it; gi:ve me time to reflect. And that's azi,.
you can do.
···'
Samuel: Well I guess that's a good deal. That should tax eve~·_
my resources.
Adam: Ah, my most civilized servant, you're beginning to s~·:
the subtlety of your position.
Samuel: Yes, I guess.
Adam: (looking at him with great veneration) Ah, Samur:l?'
you wise, learned, good . . . puny old man.
This little tale leaves off where the dialogue really just begin.s~t)
It sounds, I confess, much like Professor Alexander :Sickel's explaw, ·
ation' with one exception. Professor Bickel does not believe Adam:''
called Samuel in and had their little talk.' Samuel was simply thei:~r;\
learned his role from practice, and Adam from long deference t~I:
Samuel's judgement, learned not only to live with him as "guardiari~' .
servant but to like it - and about on the terms the dialogue sugi · .
gests." The difference between "willing" the guardian role,
<('
passive, but "liking", acceptance, may, on cursory observation,
pear to make little difference in determining the role Samuel (a_f \
legitimately play in Adam's life. However, as will be pointed ocit /'
below, the distinction may run deeper and may rest in part op-.~: >
different concept of man or the law. But it may rest, I must
quick to add, on nothing more substantial than semantics.
· ·· ./
Students of the history of judicial review might also find i_t pa*s.J, . /
ing strange that Adam's other servants (called "servants and agenl$.?'.'
for· some reason) were not more prominently mentioned,
~~
important aspect of judicial review in its role in the interrelatfofttship between the three branches of government. In fac_t, fonneti~t
this was thought to be the only role of judicial review. The vie1 .
once. universally obtained that judicial review was a neces~~

aq:~
a:~· '/)
p¢ •. .

for

• For example the very difficult problem of defining the areas of cooperatj'p~
between Adam and Samuel. Who shall determine its limits: Adam in the restibition? Adam by usage after the resolution? Adam by separate grant 0tr definiµ~~
after the resolution? Or all three? Samuel by interpreting the resolution? A:i(cl:
so forth.
, ,,
Another obviQus additional problem is the relationship between Sariiji#
and Adam's other servants or agents-alluded to only briefly in the dialogµ,~.
(See note 10 infra).
· ·)
"A. IlICKFL, THE 1.EAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
• 1d. at 21.
• Id. especially at 23-28.

...... ,..,~~-·-·····
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method of protecting the people, both individually and collectively,
from the government they had set over themselves.• The protection
was afforded by enforcing the limitations contained in the basic
charter or social compact - limitations aimed primarily at the
lawmaker and law enforcer.
The premise of the former view was that we are governed b)'
our elected officials. The view of Professor Bickel; which is typically
modern: is that we are governed through our elected officials.•
That is why Bickel sees the limitations imposed on government
through judicial review as undemocratic.• They are limitations on
the people acting collectively, i.e. on democracy. Bickel can dismiss Hamilton's explanation of the democratic basis of judicial
review bec'ause it was based on the premise of the former view that we are governed by our elected officials." Ultimately it is that
premise that Bickel is rejecting. Hamilton, Chief Justice John Marshall, and others with Hamilton's assumption would either not
• See nm FJIDERAUST No. 78. (A. Hamiltqn) . It is, of course, a view still held
by many. See, e.g., ROlltow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NontE
DAMI> LAWYER 573 (1958) •
• Perhaps this view is foreshadowed by James Madison, For example take
the following passage in a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 17, 1788:
What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in pDpular
Governments? . . . I. The political truths declared in that solemn
manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion. 2. Altho it be
generally true . . . that the danger of oppression lies in the interested
majorities of the people rather than in the usurped acts of the Government, yet there may be occasions on which the evil may- spring from
the later source; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for
an appeal to the sense of the community .. ·. . 5 Writings of Jam,es
Madison, 269, 271-74 (Hunt ed. 1904) (as ci.ted in Barrett, Bruton, and
Honnold, Constitutiotnal Law 590 (3d ed. 1968)) .
But note that Madison saw the :SUI of Rights as being really effective only
against governmental exce~s and not popular ones. Thus he basically differs
from Bickel and the Parable.
"A. BIGKF.L supra· note 3, at 16-17.
0 Id. at 18.
""I make this inference from Bickel's stat.ement at 17 that when the Supreme
Oourt exercises its power of judicial review "it thwarts the will of representatives
of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control not on behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it." This seems to show that Bickel has assumed
at le:i5t a rough identity between legislative will and popular will, whereas
Ha~1lton's .whole premise (which Bickel bad juxtaposed) was on their contranet~. It is on such identity that the "one man, one vote" rule in legislative
apportionment is predicated. Such rule is itself a manifestation of this evolution from the Hamiltonian assumption (more compatible with the pure trustee
theory of representation) to the B-ickel assumption (compatible only with the
fure del~te or reflector theory of representation) . See Part I of thi.s article,
,2 W. VA. L REv. at 23-32.
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understand the "Adam-Samuel" dialogue or think it grossly IllI:$;conceived.'1 It was based on the Bickel premise. However, there:
was some ambiguity in the parable about "other servants an&
agents." I would guess that the parable writer had some ambi~:
valence about the premises himself.
As will be· pointed out below, there still is vitality to one as/
pect of the Hamiltonian Premise that we choose not law in election~··J,. :
but lawmakers and law enforcers, i.e. that we are governed by, (n.o;k)
through}, our elected officials. This still vital aspect is the idea ol;
political leadership, an idea which is still premised in part
Platonic notions of aristocracy. As I hope to show, it adds weight
and color to the assertion that judicial review is democratic, sin4"e .
it demonstrates- that judicial review is only different in degree, n;~t\s'
kind, from other democratic decision-making.
.·
But the parable suggests another answer to the charge thai
judicial review is essentially undemocratic. It assumes the Bkk:et~
premise but nonetheless baldly asserts - if the metaphor is to b{'
taken literally - that the people would choose (are choosing in
quiet of their study) the institution of judicial review. That aµi~ .
wer is that we, the people, and as a People, have two wills: the J;jf,., ·
to the immediate practical solution to a pressing problem or f1i:k ·.
attainment of an immediately desired end, and the will to live dfo
good life and to become the great society."'
.-:;'; ·

~ti/

mi

..

u With the Hamiltonian premise the dialogue would go somthing ~{
this:

Adam: Samuel, since I trust your judgeme,it in reading and apply·
ing plain words and since you lack force or will on your own and th'U$
are yourself no threat to me, I am entrusting into your keeping this.
compact with all my servant!!' which specifically sets forth their powers
and limitationsacting
in on
my behalf. Ariytime they need your cooperas
tion in taking care of me, refuse it unless in your opinion their action
is authorized and ne>t prohibited by the compact. And to assure· your
independent judgemernt in this I appoint life,
you fOT
etc.
·.
Samuel: And shall I determine the occasions in which coopero,tion is necessary.
.
Adam: No, I've specified those. In general, the occasions for your
cooperation are those of custom and past mage. Of course, (with a
wry smile) custom and usage vague
o:re enough terms
to require some
judgmtmt in interpretation. I'll leave that to the three of you to work out.
Samuel: Well traditional cooperation leaves se>me wide areas in
U!hich the others can. run amuck.
Adam: I know, but I picked my servants tmd I can unpick them
toe>. That's enough control for many purposes. In any event it will haue to
do. The alternative would require a complete change in your personality.
And then you would be no good for anything. [and so forth].
... ·'.\
""A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 24, talks of this same bifurcation but calls; It
the "two aspects" of "actions of government." But he apparently does not fc,~f
that the second aspect (the long-run, "'good society" aspect) can be thou@t';:
of as "popular wilL"
·
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Two more general caveats on translating the parable too
literally:
Adam appears to personify a monolithic popular will. The
assertion that there is a monolithic popular will is, of course, a
gross oversimplification. But to the extent that popular will is
translated through popular elections into positive law, it is monolithic. The law has one voice. It is Adam's act. The single nature of
Adam. Moreover, since Adam's precepts are all "thou shall nots" he
appears to be the embodiment of popular will as manifest through
both federal and state politics. But the problems of federalism need
not detain us here; they are of a different genus, and would only
cloud the effort of the parable writer to set forth through metaphor
the justification for judicial review in a democracy.
I will now turn to the effort of fleshing out the ideas adumbrated in the parable - a:; a friendly critic of mine says, "to make a
short story long" - to cite specific examples of the present Court's
deviation from its "legitimate role"; the effects, of such deviation
and; some propdsals for change.

THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
I.
THE BASIS OF ] UDICIAL REVIEW AS A
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION.

The technical basis of the Supreme Court's power of judicial
review has been much mooted.'" It needs no further elaboration here.
The opinions or theories have run from those like that of Professor Wechslerl< which find express authority for judicial review
in the Constitution (Article Ill and Article VI, § 2) to those like
that of the late Judge Learned Hand which find the power implied
but only "to prevent the defeat of the venture at hand."'" Suffice it to
say that long usage and general acceptance have sanctioned the
power and have made it a hallowed institution in our American
form of government.
JJI See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DtJKE L.J.
l, 45. for an excellent "Pairtial Bibliogcaphy" of the literature on judicial
review. For example see Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept
of Administrative Constitutional Law, 69 W.VA. L. REv. Ill, 249 (1967).
Constitutional
Principles of
Law, 73 llillv. L.
'"Wechsler, Tcrward Neutral
REv. l, 2"10 (1959) •
"'L. HAND, Tm B1u. OF Rma-rs 14 (1958).
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But the little parable was not merely a way of expressing wh~
might have happened but was really aimed at beginning the ¢ffor
to "justify [judicial review] as a choice in our own time.'"" Ai:la
is man today as well as man yesterday. The parable writer doe~,\
conclude, with Bickel, that judicial review is a "deviant institut;ip~
which, "if the process is properly carried out," may re$iilt
>
"tolerable accommodation with the theory and practice of .d¢rn·.
cracy-"" Rather he contends that it is an institution which,
properly carried out, fully accords with the theory and pratdi:ii •·· ·
democracy in America - without in the least depreciating ¢tth
"the central function" of the electoral process in such tb,eoty: ~····
practice or "the policy-making power of representative in}titt:ifi!i
born of the electoral process, [ as J the distinguishing ch!!,tat:t.¢.1;!\1
of the system.",. Put in starkest terms, I contend that we, th~::'.p/
sent people, would, through the electoral process, overwheJmfhgl
endorse judicial review when judicial review is properly ti!r.tii;~f.otj
The only condition would be that the election must be held Jri tii
"quiet of our study." Of course no such election has been. o.tWijI ''
held. No empiricial proof of the assertion can be offerecl/~ Jt{f.f
yourself this: Is not the idea of the Supreme Court's {urti::d,n.
woven into the fabric of our democracy, and into the pat~tn·.
expectations of the people and how we view ourselves :'!.$ .~ ii;~tic?
that the outcome would be obvious? But aside from tb,e b~d·
sertion that judicial review would be endorsed by a natiort,4J·e
endum, our democracy, as it has evolved, has. three gen1ctral atttf~ut
which make most plausible the assertion that judicial tev:iej is/
democratic instituton, albeit one of a special nature, Tues¢ aj/'e th
dUll[ nature of the "will of the people," the leadership Qt •fjrif

J1

w)/

lt •· •·•·

cratic" element that inheres in democratic decision mc1kirtg
levels, and the general nature of democratic leadershi'.p as. Mb,,t:h{
through public dialogue. What has been referred to as w.e· d.~~1 . ·
ture of "willing," i.e. the "will" to the present act and th¢ ."·,..,r
to keep one's resolution, was the special. point of the p~ra~J#.~ ":I;.,:c
other two attributes remain to be discussed.
· ·
1• A. BrCKE.L, supra note 3, at 16.
''Id. at 28.
'"Id. at 19.
.
10 It might be some proof, however, that despite the hue and cry ~Yo/ .th
deviant practice manifested by the Dred Scott Case (Dred S~a(t v, Sarfl,gf(d, • ,.
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) and by the early New Deal Cc/,l;lrt 3,II~·. }?<Y t~ .•
Warren Court, there arose no politically viable movement to enc:! oi; evi::q weal~5.
the Court.
·
· · ..
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The Aristocratic Element in Democratic Government
''A bevy of Platonic Guardian" 00 the people probably do not
want without it being clear that they are "guardian-servants." But
there is a strong element of the aristocratic (in the Platonic sense}
running throughout our democratic institutions both in the political
l>ranch and in the courts. I do not mean aristrocratic in the sense of
a "power elite" 22 or an autonomous Establishment or anything like
an aristocracy of the ancien regime. Such aristocracies are not compatible with democracy. Rather I mean aristocratic in the sense of
trusting a large part of government, including leadership in basic
policy, to a responsible, constantly changing, amorphous group of
the most competent public officials that can be found."' Of course it
it is the general public's understanding of competency that is the
criterion, and such understanding may be viewed as wanting by
rp:;my individuals in the public. But the point is that the people
choose, by their own best lights, those who they think are best
qualified to lead, not those who they think are most like themselves.
Though "the heart of the democr~tic faith is government by the
consent of the governed,".. and this consent is manifest through
t:he electoral process, the people_ nonetheless choose to be governed
by the officials elected as well as to govern through them.
The premise is that a representative democracy is more than a
mere expediency. It is also a deliberate choice of leaders based on
the aristocratic principle defined above. People choose a representative not only because he reflects their own views on the probable issues to be decided but also because they trust his judgment
to decide issues for them - issues they either do not know of or do
not feel competent to judge. They no doubt trust his judgment partly because he reflects their general attitudes and interests and they

21

.. L HAND, supra, note 15, at 73.
Tm; REPUBLIC.
..C. WRIGHT Mru:.s, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
""See -N. THOMAS and K. LAMB, CoNGRESS, POl'.ITICS AND PRACl'ICE (1965).
'lj',dwards, The Theoretical o;nd Comparative Aspects of Reapportionment and
R!;districting with Reference to Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L R.F.v. 1265, 1272-73
(1962) cites "empirical studies on both sides of the Atlantic." He concludes,
· . . that there may be few positive correlations between the action of
the representative and the combined will of his distTict - or at least less
positive correlation than generally supposed. This is bet":ause of alleged
~uperior qualities of the house member, bis relative freedom to exercise
mdependent judgment, and also the conditioning process of group
dynamics in legislative bodies directed by institutionalized elites, not to
mentfon the restraining impact of other chambers and branches.
.. A. Bickel, supra note 3, at 27.
" See
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want his expert application of their attitudes and their interests to
issues as they arise. But more than that, they want his expert
definition of their own attitudes and interests. Madison spoke of the
capacity of representative government "to refine and enlarge the
public vieWs, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the tnie interest
of their country.""'
As a corollary to this, the people want their public officials to
carry on a dialogue with them as to what is in their interest and
what their attitude should be."' In other words, teaching is done
by all branches of government-political as well as judicial. As
Mr. Justice Brandeis so eloquently stated in Olmstead v. United
States,"' governm_ent is '-'the potent, the omnipresent teacher." The
point here, however, is that the political branches of government
also teach by means other than their example. They teach, like the
school master, through lecture and reasoned dialogue. And more
importantly (both to the nation and to the point being made
here) this dialogue concerns not only the course to be taken to
solve pressing needs, but additionally includes the basic ideals and
goals of the nation - what we are and where we are going as
people.
For ex.ample, the American people probably would not by
referendum approve of certain civil rights iegislation such ~
open housing... Nonetheless, Congress and many states have passed
such legislation. On the other hand. the American people, the
great present demos, would probably overwhelmingly 'approve of
the ideal that open housing legislation is thought by its proponents
.. Edwards, supra note 23 citing C. REARi>, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST 7!f .
(1948\.
.
,
,,.,This hypothesis will have t.o be tested in the laboratory of your own.
experlence. Two suggestions: (I) Do not let your feeling of general popular·
apathy and ignorance on political issues color your judgment as to whether
or not people generally want at least some information and inspinttion froJD.
their political leaders even at the local level, and also keep in mind that people
generally, even the so-called Silent Majority, give feed-hack to which they want ·
response. (2) The higher the political office the greater is the desire for
inspirational as opposed to informational interchan~. Various political science
studies show that the pro~ of opinion making and decision making is too
complex and variegated to be amenable to any but the grossest of measurements. See, e.g., Dexter, The Representative and his District, reprinted in New
Perseptives on the HO'USe a-f Represe,uatives 3, (1963).; R. DAHL, WHO GoVERNS.'
DEMOCRACY AND POWER lN AN AMERICAN CrlY (1961).
z 277 U.S. 438, 435 (1928).
.
""See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (196'7); Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969).
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to help actualize. Moreover, one ventures to guess that most of the
people would acknowledge that they have no precise understanding
of what "equal protection," "due process" or "badges and incidents
of slavery" mean, except in terms of equally vague ideals slich as
fairness or justice. Moreover, they would be quite diffident about
applying such ideals to particular situations. Most people would
say: "That's for courts and legislators to decide - they are trained
for it and devote all their time to it"- in short, that's their job.
But their job is yet more, for the people want and need a sense of
participation in the precise application of the ideal to concrete
situations. They want to know what an deal held with abiding
conviction - but vague sense - means in this or that situation. The
conviction is probably symbolized by a phrase (e.g., "equal protection of law," "freedom of speech," "a man's home is his castle")
or ritual (e.g., singing ''America" or saluting the flag). But, no
matter how vaguely understood, or how mute and inarticulate, it
is the conviction of a truth which thrills, a physically felt, emotional
thing. And they want to participate by being told in such a fashion,
with such articulation, that they may see the "ideal which thrills"
come to life and be thrilled anew. And this articulation should be
no pandering to the irrational. That the People are basically rational
is the faith of democracy. It is the faith of Brandeis concurring in
Whitney v. California"" - "Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion .... """ Rather this articulation is a
process of education, and " [ e] ducation is a 'drawing out' and its
business is not merely to confirm a man in what he already knows
and to exalt his own immediate preferences and predilections."31
And what of the "thrill" from this education in ideals? Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., in a footnote concluding an article on New
York Times v. Sullivan"' quotes Professor Alexander Meiklejohn of
Harvard who, when asked what he thought of the new articulation
and definition of Freedom of Expression in New York Times,
said: "It is an occasion for dancing in the streets.".. There is the
thrill from participation in the rearticulation of an abiding ideal the feeling that is "an occasion for dancing in the streets."

"'274 U.S. 357 (1927).
30 Jd. at 375.
., HowARD F. Lowlty COLLEGE TALKS 115

a. Blackwood ed. 1969) .

""376 U.S. 254 (1964) .
"'Kalven, The New York Times
on Case: A Note
''The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 SUl'lt:EME CoUR.T REvraw 191, 221 n.125.
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There are two sorts of "basic ideals" which "thrill" when. fteyh, e:'

Iy articulated and exemplified. First, there is the ideal image of:.t>,ti/f
present selves: the image of what we ought now to be - the Q;;ttio'ttafi:
conscience; that nation in the "quiet of its study." It is analpgo4ii~>\
an individual's resolution to live a good and moral life. Second}
there is the ideal image of the nation we want to become,
want to progress to - our own vision of the great and happy
It is analogous to an individual's ambition to be great pr rfoh:,
famous. Both ideals are elusive, overlapping, a mixture of half-tori~,
scious abstraction and vague but profound emotion.
·,t ·· ·

wh~-tJi;n
:nat:i~k}
~f

To recapitulate - from the above discussion the foliPw.Jpgi
three premises emerge. First the people have two often coni;t;,i:di~tih<:
wills; (a) the will to the immediate end and (b) the will tiJ, ~je,'
ideal (also twofold) . Second, choosing men as "leaders" a,s Welf;k;}
"reflectors" is of the essence of our democracy. Third, leadtrship;\~<
a modern democracy must be by teaching through reasoned; \J:ia/
logue and through articulation of shared ideals as applied to, ~~Ji{
crete situations, such that there is a public sense of participatigj:j(l
any decision made so that it can be truly said: "it is the' ):'>e_o.p)e'
decision."
ii,,\/)
Based on those three premises one can make a defen~.:o ·
judicial review as democratic and can begin to see at least..
of the limitations on the institution. Since democracy is dl:i.fiutihf
the above premises as that system of government in which gJvh~l
mental policy is a manifestation of the will of the people thtg,6.gij .
their leaders, then, if there are ideals which the nation will~'
actualize, and if such ideals (1) are felt to be immutib1¢
fundamental to the society it thinks it is and wants to coQtii'li:if
be, (2) and are seen to be sometimes threatened by the n.a:fi~:n's
will to the immediate end, and (3) are framed in terms of
law, it follows that the people can best realize these ideals th:t~i);glt'/
a body of leaders which is at once: (a) as immutable a,s ptat~t~f<
human institutions can be; (b) as removed from the pressµte qfJh,e;
people's other "will" (i.e., the will to the immediate end) @'. is'
consistent with the people's choosing its members at all, b11t whfcll
body likewise will not unnecessarily interfere with or enda:i;tg"er ;
such other "will", and; whose members are (3) tra,iti,ed' Abd:
practiced in the interpretation and application of posid:ve·
There are such ideals: the precepts of the Constitution - i~uta!zft!'i\
fundamental, supreme positive legal commands - the feqpi!:'f

silin.

to):
:~-n ··

tq
p®•ffeve

l~~'.
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Resolution. There is such a body of leaders: The Supreme Court
of the United States and its extension, the federal (and to an extent the state) judiciary. Its members are appointed for life sans
djminishment in pay and are chosen by those leaders who are them~elves chosen for their leadership as opposed to their mere reflective
qJJalities. Thus, as a body and as individual members the court is as
apolitical as is consistent with choosing it at all. Its members are
judges. in a court of law and thus are experienced in interpreting
positive law. And, finally, as a body, it is only a court of law and
thus cannot unnecessarily interfere with or endanger the People's
other will.

' Constitutional I deals As Positive Law
A final word on "ideals" before discussing the limitations on
judicial review: The ideals of the Constitution are framed in the
fashion of positive legal rules and their purport is to establish
Ittinimum standards of behavior for collective conduct (through
government) below which such collective conduct can not fall and
still participate in our broadly shared notion of ourselves as a good
society. As that notion changes so must the interpretation of the
ccmstitutional norms change, and just that much. But since these
norms are framed like positive law, the pouring of new content
into the words must seem natural, not forced; otherwise the felt
immutability of the norm will be damaged. Thus, as with the interpretation of any rule, the interpretation must appear to proceed
from the rule itself and not from the interpreter.
For example, the words "to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence".. no doubt originally meant the accused had the right
to bring his own counsel into court in a criminal trial." But education over many years taught most Americans that expert assistance
is absolutely essential to holding one's own in the esoterica of a
ttial." Affluence made the cost of providing counsel for the poor
.setm immaterial. C.Ouple this with the gradual evolution in egalitarian ideals, and it eventually becomes unthinkable that an accused
should stand trial for a major offense without counsel just because he

.. u. s. CONST,

amend: VI.

. . "'"Originally, in England, a prisoner was not permitted to be beard by
1:9unsel upon the general issue of not guilty on any indictment for treason or
feJony.'' See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466-68 (1942). See also, Wechskr,

supra note 14 at 18.

· ""See Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-463 (l93S).
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cannot afford one."' Thus the ~ords "to have the Assistance of Coun- .
sel ..." came gradually to "mean" the absolute right to counsel regardl~ of ability to pay and therefore to mean a correlative duty o(
the state to provide counsel. The gradual enforcement of such
standard by most state polities through positive law was concrete
evidence of this new meaning."" Moreover, the right to court-ap• .
pointed counsel was by 1963 thought to be so fundamental to a £air·
trial that it had become part of the idea of "due process." Gideon v.:
Wainwright"" was simply an announcement of that fact.'°

Constitutional Ideals Versus Other Ideals
Constitutional ideals are different in kind from the ideals mentioned above as the "goals of society", i.e.> the ideal society we want
to become, that we are (hopefully) in constant progress toward. For
example, the Four Freedoms of President Franklin Roosevel('i
were hopes for a future world, but the first two - freedom of speetb:: ,;,
and freedom of religion - were, for Americans, present reality en-,
shrined in the Constitution... That is, they participate in the idea,
of what we think we are. The second two - freedom from want and
freedom from fear - were goals for the future, even for American$,,
They participate in the idea of what we want to become. For tM,<':
former, the constitutional ideals, the Supreme Court is the para,;, a!
mount teacher but, of course, not the only teacher. For the latte],};,<
the ideals as "goals for the future", the President and Congress a~', (
the primary teachers.
Constitutional ideals are different in degree from other valu¢s, . ;:
that participate in our ideal of the society that is. The ideal "i.it
can be represented by a hierarchy of values from, say, taxation based:'
on real ability to pay, through public relief, security for those oµt
of work for economic reasons, security for the aged and disable<lr
to secret indictment by grand jury, to freedom of speech. Only tli!;L {:a
heights of such hierarchy are in the Constitution - only those ·
values which are so widely shared as to be felt part of the "common·· .·
'

-u

~,.

• Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (amicus curiae bri¢f
filed by 22 stat.es) ri,ith Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467-471 (1942).
• !172 US. 335 (1962), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
.
""See concuning opinion by Harlan, J. in the Gideon case at 349. See al&o,·
Israel Gideon v. Wamwright: THE "ART" OF OvERRtJLING, IN Tm: SUPltEM'.E·
CoURT AND nm CoNsrrnmoN 263 (1965), which
criticizes
the Court's opinion:,
by Justice Black for the way in which it overruled Betts.
.. 2 Great Issues
American
in
History 39'4·99 (R. Hofstadter ed. 1960) •
.. U.S. CoNS'I'- amend I.

1--·~

·.:V:i+,··--:., · .... ·.. -.-...... ~ . · , · ····-~------·-···- ··-·-.
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sense of humanity" and so deeply learned as to be felt immutably
part of the nature of society as it ought to be. Hence -the phrase natural rights of man.
At the top of the hierarchy of ru·ticulators of constitutional
ideals is the Supreme Court. But, of course, many voices, from the
President's, on through other elected officials, to newspapers, school
teachers, parents, etc., articulate, criticize, inform and form those
primary ideals and shape and reshape the hierarchy of societal
values.
The limits of the Supreme Court's role now concern us.

n.
LIMITS INHERENT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION.

Although it would be silly to suggest that the Supreme Court's
role can be simply and neatly defined and thus limited, its three
chief characteristics can be broadly seen as limiting its role. If the
limits which inhere in its attributes are not observed, the Court
to that extent loses its legitimacy as a. democratic institution and to
that extent also loses its effectiveness as a guardian-teacher of constitutional ideals. As was stated above, the Court is legitimately
democratic because the nature of the people's primary or ·'over
will," as manifest in its constitutional resolution, needs protection
from its will to the immediate end. It needs such protection from a
court of law composed of judges not subject to political recall. Thus
the Court's three primary characteristics, which by definition limit
its role are: (a) It is a court of law; (b) It is an independent judi·
ciary; (c) It interprets the People's Resolution framed in the form
of positive legal rules. These limits are taken up below in the
order given.

Limits to the Court's role arising from
its character as a co;,..-rt of law.
The Supreme Court's role is defined by the Constitution as
extending only to certain "cases" and "controversies,"" i.e., it is to
be a court of law in the traditional sense. Although there is much
merit in determining difficult constitutional issues in the context
of concrete cases,.. it also substantially limits the legitimate role
.,. U.S. C'DNs'I. art. III.
.. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Frankfurter,
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the Court can play in democratic policy-making. In making this
point in 1941, at the tailend of the resurgent criticism of judicial
review caused by the "old guard" "new deal" Court, the late Robert.
H. Jack.son (later Mr. Justice Jackson) said:
Judicial justice is well adapted to ensure that established legislative rules are fairly and equitably applied to
individual cases_ But it is inherently ill suited, and never
can he suited, to devising or enacting rules of general social
policy. Litigation procedures are clumsy and narrow, at
best; technical and tricky, at their worst."
A court of law is limited in its fact"gathering to the particus
lar incident involved in the case before it. Any evidence beyond
such dispute is irrelevant_ Therefore, the evidence gathered lacks
generality. Just the opposite obtains in legislative fact-gathering for policy making. Thus in cases in which ihe decision turns orl
accepting or rejecting a rule made aft.er legislative fact-gathers
ing, and where the rule is integral to a scheme for general regulation pursuant to a political policy decision, a court should be chary
of rejecting such rule based on its limited inquiry. It should in any
event pay special deference to the legislative decision. Moreover;.
this consideration should in some kinds of cases absolutely preclude
tampering with the legislative decision. Such cases are thosi:l
that can be classed either (I) under the rubric of federalism wheti
congressional or presidential action is questioned, or (2) under the
rubric of "substantive due process" or "equal protection of the laws/' ''
provided that no specific constitutional rule prohibiting the govern,
mental action can be asserted, or that even from the limited fads
gathering of a court proceeding the legislative determination
patently appears to be either purely arbitrary or manifests a clear
legislative purpose which is contrary to a constitutional ideal_
The emphasis here is on the fact-gathering limitations of a
court hearing - its "hit and miss'' nature, tendency to hard cases,
and quantity of facts relevant. For example in Railroad Retirement ·
Bd. v. Alton,.. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.," and United States v.
Butler' the Supreme Court, on the meager record of a law suit
laced with elaborately unstated judicial notice reversed the findings of Congress as to what affected interstate commerce and what
.. R. JACKSON, Tm:. S"IRUGGLE
.. 295 us. 330 (1935) .
""' 296 U.S. 238 (1936) .
48 297 U.S. I
(1936).
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was in the general welfare. True, it enlisted the legalese of determining "pcwer" and simply brushed aside the legislative findings
as irrelevant, since questions of "power" are questions of law. But
the question of power ult.imately turned· on the gathering and
examination of a myriad of facts about our economy and the interrelationship of its parts. Courts are simply unsuited for such work..
The same problem obtained in Lochner v. New Yorl/" and the cases
which struck. down welfare legislation on "substantive due process"
grounds. The court talked in terms of protecting the right of
"freedom of contract" (which was simply assumed to be a basic right
and to be relevant) , but resolved the issues on its own assessment
of social and economic reality. One is struck on reading these cases
by the utter presumptuousness of judges. I stress here their presuming to substitute their version of reality (based on evidence from
a law suit and the judges' own experience) for that of the legisla"
tive fact-gatherer. Their presuming also to impose their values on
society will be spoken of later.
The United :States Supreme Court has long since abandoned
this presumptuousness in the area ronghly delimited by the words
"economic'' or "property" rights, but the lesson has not been "unlearned" by state courts."' Today, however, the same presumptuousness is in full vitality if the talismanic label, human rights, can be
pasted on the interests of the asserting litigant. Last term, for example, the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson"' substituted its
assessment of reality for that of Congress and 40 to 46 state legislatures in compromising the interest of individuals in interstate travel
and the interest of state governments in providing adequate welfare
for its citizens on a sound fiscal basis. The Court did this by the process of declaring the right to interstate travel as fundamental (which
no one would deny) and saying therefore that a compelling state
interest must be shown (by the state, apparently) to justify any
classification which serves to penalize that right. But how compelling the state interest is and to what degree the classification penalizes the right to interstate travel are questions of broad social and
economic fact. The decision of the Supreme Court was, in effect,
the substitution of its assessment of social and economic reality,
'"HI& U.S. 45 (1905).
"'See Hetherington, State Economic Regulations and Substantive Due Pro·
Law,
cess
o_f
53 Nw. U. L. REv. 13, (1958) and Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (195D).
"'394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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arrived at in the cloister of a court of law, for assessment made ; ·.
over a period of some 30 years by the branch of government specifi"'
cally suited to gather such legislative facts and make such assessment
of broad social and economic reality. As is typical of such adjudic~tion, the parties to the litigation were examples of those most, ;
harshly treated by application of the general rule... This cannot ·
be conducive to an objective assessment of the total picture.
The inquiry of the Court would have been more appropriately
confined to determining whether the legislative policy clearlyignored proper consideration of the right to travel. The fact tha}
Congress had imposed a one year upper limit on state residency
requirements certainly manifested its concern for such rights.
·
The decision goes a long way toward forcing complete federal ( ·•.•·
control of a matter that through long tradition has been primarily, ·
of local concern. Perhaps a correct assessment of the reality of high-. ,.
ly mobile modem America would demand federal control. B1Jt '/
such "correct assessment" has not been written in the sky or dis,,;,·
covered in the basement of an ancient temple. Fallible men mus(
grope for it. What men should they be? Congress, with all i'i$:;
resources for informing itself, or nine men in a court of law?
··.
Is it any wonder, then, that the Supreme Court of Appeals of!'~
West Virginia presumed to establish the policy for the state
determining the proper majority for lifting property tax ceilings. hf j
order to aid public schools? If an individual's interest can be elevated{..
to constitutional heights and placed under a rubric commanding{;
wide acceptance (e.g., right to travel, free speech, one man-ou.1:f
vote) , then despite the inherent limitations of a law suit the Cou:tt:' .'.
will itself make the legislative judgment, weighing that interest: l'.
against others of society. Such examples of judicial hubris by thil .
recent Court are too numerous to catalogue. Some of the mo:r:~ •
visible are Baker v. Carr/' Mapp v. Ohio,04 Levy v. Louisiana," In t¢\;"
Gault,.. and Mirand.a v. Arizona... The decisions listed are simpi-y' ·:

hf

"' Id.
03 369 U.S. 186 (1002).
""367 U.S. 643 (1961) .
.. 391 U.S. 68 (1968) .
""387 U.S. I (1967) •
.,. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Of course, it was not legislative policy which was
upset by Miranda, but rather state adminisu-ative and judicial policy in the
area of criminal law enforcement. Such policy had been worked out throu!\"h.
long, close, daily experience with the exigencies of local law enforcement. '!"bi( •
absence of legislative decision correcting the "abuses" found by the Supr~e; ,.
Court may well be no more than evidence that the sta.te legislative fact gathering ,
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examples of judicial intrusion into broad policy making, but each
decision is not necessarily outside the pale of proper constitutional
a.djudication. The policy involved in In re Gault was at least partially within the peculiar expertise of judges since it involved court
procedure for juveniles. It also involved examination of the premise underlying the relaxation of ordinary due process protection
' """ the supposed non-punitive nature of juvenile correction. The
myth of such premise had long since been rather conclusively exposed. The evidence of this, in sources easily available to the court,
and on a subject that judges are qualified to evaluate, made the
Court a not inappropriate policy-maker. Nonetheless, the example
{n Gault of broad policy-making· adds to the overall pattern
of the image of the Court as intrusive. ·when a pattern is established,
·. examples apparently comporting with it strengthen its appearance,
even though the example is supportable individually.
Another limitation inherent in the Supreme Court's being a
court of law is its ability to give remedy. The traditional remedies
' of fine, imprisonment, damages, m1unction and declaratory
judgment are effective only when the number of people affected is
telatively small. Since it has neither the power of sword nor purse,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter was wont to point out, the Court can
effect injunctions or declarations that really "run to the world"
only through moral suasion.
When the Court acts in areas where its traditional remedies are
µnavailing, it must either hm,e the cooperation of those enjoined
. or enlist the support of those who do command the broadly coer·ci,ve powern of the state, i.e. the political branches of government.
Only to the degree that such cooperation or support is forthcoming
is the decree that runs at large effective. The two primary examples
of this are the reapportionment cases.. and the school desegregation
cases.''" In the former there has been more or less willing cooperaindicated that no general change in administrative policy was warranted. For a
general criticism of the Court's role in this area of broad public policy see, H.
fJUENDLY, The·Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure (1967), 235, and A
Postscript on Miranda, 266 BENCHMARKS: (1967).
"' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"'Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ;• Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 349 U.S.
294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958) ; Griffith v. County School
B.oard of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (tax supports for private
a,t.tendance); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1~68) ("freedom of choice" plan); Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Educatmn,. 396 U.& 1218 (1969) (immediate desegregation). See also congate
desegregation cases: e.g., Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
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tion ... In the latter there has been some willing cooperation and some ...
support from political government. But further desegregation m~~
now be a function of further such support. And such support is a .
function of the moral persuasiveness of the Court. Such moral pet;'.
suasion comes both from the felt rightness of the decision and frorni
the prestige of the Court. So far as the latter must be relied on,
that far must the moral capital, built up from long tradition,· I:>~

ju$f

.

~~

Thus the Court has always recognized that it must be vetj,i
chary of making, with its decisions, promises that must be counter~,:
signed by others. The risk of so doing ought to be undertaken on1y\\
when the constitutional ideal is so compelling and so flouted tfo;t1i' >
the denial of the ideal causes a sickness in the nation's soul and w¢,;'
are, as a people, in the quiet of our study, deeply ashamed. An~:
then only once in a lifetime. That once in our lifetime is schqpf, /
desegretation, and for that time the Court needs all its "motaf' Y
capital". The Court can lose that "capital" in other ways, forcan make unpopular decisions. This the Court has done, and don,(.\" .
needlessly and wastefully. For this reason alone Engel v. Vitale"'>/
its progeny.. were improvidently decided. They were not importaitt'. ·.•..
enough to be worth the loss of "capital". Mere unpopularity is hQtf )
sufficient grounds for holding the other way. It is, however, a reasotJr<·
for not deciding at all, if there is a principled ground for avoidan~Mf( (
and the interest protected approaches de minimis."' But unpopu.Ia1;;'.. <
ity especially gross unpopularity in periods of relative public tta;nt' <X'
quillity, should cause the Court to give pause, and such pause a~; \:
will be discussed below, shows Engel to be an unfortunate piece &f( /
constitution-teaching.
') . '.}
A final word on judicially unenforceable decisions: If the Cou~f }
lacks sufficient moral suasfon, either through the force of
•<

i~\ /

an4·(

mi

U.S. 877 (1955) (public beach) ; Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.6. _879
(~955)
_(puWf /
golf course). All the above decisions were unanimous, m.volvmg nmet~ ·. .·.•
Jmtices altogether.
.
··' ·
""See Part I of this article. 72 W. VA. L. REV. I, 29·30 (1970).
., 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (The Regents' Prayer Case).
.•>
•• Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (The Bible Reii.4{
ing <:;tses).
•
· ·····
• Lack of standing
was t h e g,round £or avoi"dance t h at cou Id. h ave b~µ
invoked. In fact much doctrine on standing had to be ignored . to reach th.~ .•·
merits. See
Quis Cusrodist lpsos Custodes? The Sch<>ol
Prayer
Ca.r!i.i1 ·
1963 The supreme Court Review, I. 15·33; Sutherland, Establishment Accordfri:g
to Engel, 76. HARv. L. REv. 25, 41-45 (1962) ; lumper, Pr«yer, Public Schools lit!.!.(•
the Supreme Court, 61 Mice. L. REv. 1001, 1056-1064 (1963) .
.. See, Sutherland, supra, note 63·.

Brown,

.. :·:. -....._, ,,.~........ ,.,, ..•... , .,..
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ideal articulated or through its prestige, to induce either willing
albeit begrudging, cooperation or governmental support, then its
edict goes unobeyed. If the acts of disobedience are open, and the
edict well known, then the law is flouted. If the flouting is by responsible public officials, so much the worse for respect for law and
courts of law. All these conditions obtain to some extent in school
prayer cases. True the "edict" did not literally run to the world,
but the language and obvious implication of the opinions is that all
prayer in public schools is forbidden, if a part of regular classroom
activity ... To the extent that prayer con.tinues,.. disrespect for law
and the Supreme Court is fostered. Thus (be prepared to gawk at
this) the Supreme Court has "taught" that law can be broken with
impunity and its commands ignored.

B.
Limits arising out of the Court's character
· as an independent judiciary.
In order that the People's Resolution as to fundamental precepts could be better kept, the Supreme Court was given the entire
judicial power and made an independent and coequal branch of
government. It was given independence so it could be above politics
- above the storm of transient emotion, above stress and momentary passion, above the tug and pull of faction, interest, and party.
It was made coequal that it might better h,we the power to refuse
cooperation with acts of physically powerful and popular arms of
the government whenever it should feel they violate the People's
Resolution. The Court's power is rooted in the respect that English
speaking peoples have long held for law and courts of law. This
respect for law is manifested by the viability of our Political institu"'Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W. D. Mich. 1965). This case represents a successful effort by a district court judge to work out an accoromodation
with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) for parents who wanted their children
to pray. This was accomplished without straining the facts or the law. But see
Despain v. DeKalb County Community School Di.strict, 255 F. S,upp. 655 (N.D.
Ill. 1966) where both facts and law were stra-ined. The court seems to be saying
t.o parents who wanted a federal court to enjoin a kindergarten teacher from
requiring their daughter to say a simple grace (with the word "Cod" deleted):
"Ask a silly question, you get a silly answer."
"" One may only guess the extent to which pra-yer is still a daily activity in
American schools. Nonetheless I "guess" that whi"le there is very little daily
pray~r left that is rigidly enforced by supervising authority, there still substa~t1al prayer intiated at the teacher level. For a study of one community's reaction to the Prayer Cases see w. Muir, PRAYER IN THE PullLIC ScaooLS - LAW
AND ATTITUDE C!IANCE (1967),
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tions - institutions relatively free from revolution violent eith~:r
in form or substance. This respect for courts of law is manifest in tjkr
unique, largely judge-made, common law system. Yet, even thotigh
such respect is necessary to such power, equally necessary is fh_~
status of "coequal branch." For in Great Britain there is such t¢s·
pect, but there is no such power. The American Supreme Court
was given coequality despite its being independent of popul~r
recall or other direct pressure, because it was, after all, only a cou}t
of law exercising only judicial power and thus had "neither FORCE\
nor WILL hut merely judgment"."' Thus it should be seen that
Court's independence, coequality and judiciality are interdepeii-\
dent qualities. The Court can be independent because it is orjjf)
judicial. But since it is judicial, it must be independent. It mif{t<
be coequal so it can be truly independent, and it can be coeqti:il
even though independent because it is only judicial. Each is a
dicate for the other; each must be maintained for the other to JJ'e, ',
legitimate. It is largely the people and the palitical branches actirtg
conjointly under felt constitutional compulsion who have main- .
tained and continue to maintain the Court's ooequality and inJ:l~- <
pendence, but it is for the Court to maintain its judidality whJ~ \
justifies such other maintenance. It is limitations inherent in t&b{
Court's maintenance of its judiciality that concern us here.
"
For purposes of neatness, if not accuracy, the limitations t@ '
be seen as (1) the "power" to settle only judicial disputes, (2} tb'e.• · .
"right" to answer only judicial questions, and (3) the "duty" t~
give only judicial answers. Both the "power'' and the ''right" rel;:i~¢
to the Court's jurisdiction, although the second limitation, lack di,
the right to decide non-judicial (i.e. political) questions, may, a~d \
often does, occur in a dispute which is judicial and thus otherwJ~e. · • ·
within the Court's jurisdiction. But if the Court lacks the right
answer a particular question and if the question must be answe1;¢d }
to settle the dispute, then the Court effectively lacks the authority:
settle the dispute. To say a court lacks authority to settle a dispti:je.)
is the logical equivalent of saying it lacks jurisdiction. All tht{~~ <
"power", "right", and "duty", are constitutional limitations. Thµ,~ • •
if a court lacks the right to answer a question necessary to setd~~
ment of the dispute, it really has no power to settle the dispute, i,1,
its jurisdiction given in one way is ousted in another. As I admitt¢~;
the trichotomoy of power, right and duty is, in this conttj/)t,

ti'e:

pr~ ,

t? \
to\:

"'THE

FEDE\!.AUST
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convenient but not entirely satisfactory. Moreover, a Judis·
dictional analysis can be applied to the "duty" in some circumstances, for it is a constitutional duty to give only judicial answers.
If an apparently judicial question cannot be given a judicial answer
a court cannot answer it, and, perforce, it becomes a non-judicial (i.e.
political) question; for, if one is asked (say) "Is it A or B?" and if it
is one's duty either to answer "A" or to answer "B" and thus one has
no right to give another answer, then if one perceives that the answer should be "partly A and partly B", one has the duty to say,
"that is a question I cannot answer.""" Again, if the question is crucial
to settling the dispute, then though the power to settle appears, and
the right to answer also, but the question cannot be answered in a
way consistent with constitutional duty, then there is no right to
answer and no power to settle. Thus, inability to give a judicial answer is the logical equivalent of lack of jurisdiction."" But to call this
"duty" a jurisdictional question would do violence to received
.. The problem of the ronstitutionability of the so-called "benign quota'; in
public housing and public schools is a good illustration of the Court's being
unable to give a judicial answer to an admittedly judicial question. So far the
Court has simply avoided the issue by refusing to review lower court decisions.
See, Dalaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y. 2d 193, Cert. denied, 379 U.SJ. 881 (1964);
School Comm. v. Board of Educ. 352 Mass. 693 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S.
572 (1968). See generally, Goldman, Be.rzign Classification; A Constitution
Dilemma, 35 U. CIN-N. L. REv. 349 (1966); "Developments in the Law - Equal
Protection," 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1969'); Bittker, "The Case of the Checkerboard Ordinance: An &periment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L J. 1387 (1962);
Navasky, "The Benevolent Housing Quota," 6 HowAit» L J. 3(} (1960). The
"benign quota" cases involve a political compromise which attempts to realize
the goal of ;,:adal integration while recognizing the social reality that when
more than a certain percentage (say about 30%) of blacks move into a housing
project or neighborhood all the whites move out. Thus following the strict constitutional principle of legal "color blindness" docs not achieve the real ideal of
the fourteenth amendment wlrich is total i:iJ.t.e~tion or societal, as opposed to
simply legal, "color blindness." The fourteenth amendment embodies the ideal
of what we are now but is more deeply premi;red on an ideal of what we want
to become, an ideal ''goal'' for the future. As was stated above, such goals are
for the political branches to articulate and attempt to· actualize. Thus "benign
q_uotas" create a conflict between the present jdeal and the future ideal goal.
Smee "benign quotas" help actualize the latter, and the latter is the real premise
of the f~rmer, "benign quotas" should be upheld. But no neutral principle has
been artJ.culated for an exception to the constitutional rule of legal "color blindn~ss":"""benign quota'• a.re a matter of political expediency. Thus the correct ronst1tuuonal answer to the question of integrating housing is not one a court
bound to announce its decisions only in neutral principles can give. It therefore, is
duty bound to announce that there is no judicial answer to the constitutional issue
a~d the political answer must stand. See Bickel, supra note 3, at 60-65. But Prof.
B1c~el s?-ggest,s a solution to the judicial d i l ~ of benign quotaS whkh is rooted m his notion of the Court's "passive VlrtUff>." Bickel, supra note 3, 111-198.
That such "virtues" are really "vices" is the leitmotif of this entire section B.
""However, as is shown below, the duty is breached most commonly not
because no "judicial mswer" could be given. but because no "judicial answer'' is
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ways of talking about jurisdiction. When a court finds a questfotn }
that it cannot both dutifully and correctly answer, it usually hoiq\,}
either that it -is a "political question" or that the answer given
the political branch must stand, thus affirming such branch's an$w¢r.:
To analyze more fully each limitation and to discover its obs:¢t-•.
va:nce anc:i non-observance by the Supreme Conrt, and to adurnhta.k/
what the Court thereby teaches, they are taken up serially under tli!!.ii-\
familiar rubrics: "power" as "case and controversy" non-juiitic:lfi
bility; "right" as "political question" non-justiciability; and ''dutyi\<:
after Professor Wechsler, as "neutral principles" of decision, -· '· i

by:::

(1)

The case and controversy limitation

"Case and controversy" is the rubric under which the fed¢t~l}
judiciary's constitutional jurisdiction is discussed and, unfort11ni:(t•
ly, analyzed. Of course, the reason is plain if not sufficient-,-;\_rt,i~~'.e\
III states that the "judicial power" shall extend to "all cases" ~j~ /
certain "controversies". This was early assumed to mean onlv to .,..,.;1,,_ :--·.
cases" and certain "controversies."" What is a "case and controver$yl; \
then? Other constitutional language helps a little with the de'·ot\ }
//
tion, as Article III adds after the words "all Cases" the p
"in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [etc.J:•11 tlie\
words "arising under [ etc. J" and the specification of certain
troversies are limitations. concerned with federalism. That Iimtfiit\
tion is not relevant here. Here the concern is with what
cial" half of the "federal judiciary" means. For this, the wotd$
Law and Equity" are helpful for they suggest that "all easel' ias )
meant to convey the idea of cases in the traditional com:tntm, ,
sense. Justice Frankfurter suggested that "cases" means: "Gen.er~ly
speaking the business of the colonial courts and the courts of W~t/
•

it£lf/
!

t!qr·/

the. ;,jJdlCc
'!Jh/

f~ /

given. Even here the Court is, in one sense, acting ultra viTes but it is, i,n :~e ?j
same sense that a servant acts negligently for his master, which acts,, (Qir pl;it- \ ,
poses of common law liability, are said to be authorized..
' , ,,,,
Bickel,••
supra note 3 at 114-115.
n US. Const. art. Ill, 2. The full paragraph reads:
,
The judicial Power shall ex.tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,_
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United State\!, ajic:l
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - tr;> all..
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - tQ ill
Cases of admiralty and maritime Juri.roiction; - to Controvep;ies to
which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two
or more States; - between Citizens of different States - betwe;¢n_
Citizens of the same State clajming lands under Grants- of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citiz¢ns
or Subjects.
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minister when the constitution was framed.""' This definition would
include, of course, those matters for which the legislative authority
of the state authorizes judicial remedy, whether or not the particular
remedy was part of the "Law and Equity" at the time the Constitution was adopted.'" But Frankfurter's dictum has never been adopted
,, by the court as its guideline. Moreover, the recent case of Flast. v.
Cohen" suggests that the rubric "case and controversy" has given
way to the word "standing" as the· operative language by which to
examine the threshold constitutional-juris.dictional issue.'·' And, contrary to what Juliet might have thought, there is something in a
name, at least for abstractions if Jiot for roses and young men. In
fact the "name" may be the "thing". In any event, Flast v. Cohen
was a sharp break with tradition; it typifies the present Court's
attitude toward itself, the other branches and the Constitution; it
js illegitimate; and it teaches attitudes that are both undemocratic
and corruptive of the respect necessary to the authority of the
elective branches. In order to demonstrate that Flast v. Cohen is- all
of that, a fresh analysis of the "case and controversy" limitation may
be useful.
As suggested above the limitation called "case and controversy"
could be better described as the power to settle "only judicial disputes." _Both words, "judicial" and "disputes," have a distinct constitutional derivation and meaning. "Judicial" comes from both
the Article III language "judicial Power" and the notion that certainly obtained in 1789 and still largely obtains today that "cases
in law and equity" describes judicial, as oppased to political, disputes. Moreover the words "case and controversy" suggest a
''d_i~ute", not merely a legal "question." I have suggested that in
this context there is something in a name and am now suggesting
Qiat the better name to describe the threshold constitutional-jurisdktional issue in a federal court is "judicial disputes." Thus a "case
~nd controversy" is a "judicial dispute", nothing more nor less.
· ''Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149', 150. (1951)
(ro~curring opinion); to the same effect see Coleman v. Miller, 30.7 U.S. 433,
4llo (1939) (concurring opinion).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
'le 392 U.S. S-3 (1968).
•• Of course this change did not just suddenly happen; it has been in prog-re,ss for at least thirty years. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939)
(c»ncurring opinion of Frankfurter J.). It is of some significance that the word
"st\i,nding" is not used in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) to
char.i,cterize the taxpayer's suit not being a "case or controversy."
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What then are judicial disputes? Well, to begin with a tautology, the settlement of judicial disputes is the governmental function of courts of law, and a court of law is that part of government
that settles judicial disputes. A "dispute" as opposed to a "question",
" r:ic'" v:rrn i~ nsed here, involves the problem of whether or not
some governmental action be taken - coercive or non-coercive-regu1 atory, proprietary, or defensive. Traditionally, judidal disputes are those disputes that involve coerci11e'" action against particular, named individuals. By contrast, legislative disputes over coercive action involve the use of coercion against generally defined
individuals. Such legislative action is more commonly referred to
merely as "regulative" since actual coercion is almost solely a judicial function. In fact, in common law countries almost all" domestic
use .of the coercive power of the state is channeled through judicial
tribunals where the particular facts calling for coercion are developed and the law calling for coercion is interpreted with particular
reference to the developed facts."' An even broader generalization
can be made: a politically civilized society is at least a society in
which all normative violence is channeled through the state, and all
state violence through courts, and all non-normative violence is
punished by the state.
But, traditionally, courts have not cooperated in the non-coercive actions of government. For instance, the government has the
power to spend from the general revenue, to acquire and manage
property for general use and to raise and maintain armed forces for
·"'By "coercive action" is meant actual physical coercion, not the felt coercion of a seeming Hobson's choice, although most judicial action is effected by
only threatening to i;oerce, i.e., an in_junction, money judgment, even declaratory
relief, usually is "voluntarily" complied with, But what makes these remedies.
peculiarly judicial is that the court will order its officers actually to take your
money, sell your property, or put your body in jail. If an injunction were coercive
per se then so would be the threatened penalty of the criminal law. But the
actual coercion of the criminal Jaw is accomplished through the courts. So also
the actual coercion· of an injunction follows the contempt proceeding, as an adjunct to the original order. The distinction between criminal and civil action in
this context is merely one of time: the civil order allows one an opportunity
to comply voluntarily before it a.ctuaUy pushes; the criminal judgment itself
pushes. My stark use of the word "coercion.. is an effort to cut through abstractions and imprecision to the physically concrete wherever it is possible in this
"amorphous" area of "case and contrOversy" and "standing." See Flast v. Cohen,
392 Us. 83, 99 (1968).
"'Theoretically it is "all" but there are exceptions for such exigencies as
riot or initial police arrest and detention. Even legislative contempt is usually,
although not necC$Sarily, channeled through the judiciary.
"See United States v. B.rown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) cf. Morey v. Doud., 354
U.S. 457 (1957) .
.
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defense. These functions of government are not lawmaking in the
regulatory sense, although to be sure, when the legislature exercises
them, they do so by the same mode of action as when they are
regulating behavior, i.e. by legislative act. Of course, in certain ways
the non-coercive functions of government demand coercive help and
therefore are often exercised with the cooperation of the judiciary.
For instance, spending demands taxing and the coercive power of
tax collection is channeled through the courts. When a tax is tied to
a particular spending program and the courts are asked to cooperate in coercing payment of the tax, the constitutionality of the
spending program can be challenged by way of challenging the
tax legislation of which it is inextricably a part."' A taxpayer is even
permitted to do this in an action for declaratory relief where the
coercion of payment is imminent."" Likewise, the acquisition of property often involves coercing a sale, and this power of eminent domain is channeled through the courts. In either instance, getting
money or property," the state is empowered to coerce and a judicial
dispute, i.e. a "case", arises because of the need, stemming from
long, deeply embedded tradition, to channel the coercive authority
of the state through the courts_ But the legislative spending or
taking is challenged only incidentally to such suits to coerce. They
are simply instances where the courts have traditionally been asked
to cooperate in governmental coercion and will refuse such cooperation if in the court's- opinion the action would violate the people's
resolution.
A case like Baker v. Carr raises the further question of whether
or not the legislature can enlarge this area of cooperation, i.e.
whether Congress can make a "case in law" that was not one traditionally_ For instance, courts have not traditionally been asked to
cooperate in legislative apportionment. However, a federal jurisdictional statute authorized, to put it in language used here, the
federal courts to cooperate in coercing protection of interests guaranteed by the federal Constitution against state action. It did so by
authorizing suits against "persons" acting "under color" of state or
territorial law and not by direct suit against the sovereign state.'"'
Nonetheless, actions under the Civil Rights Acts are in reality
...See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Stewart Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
""Nashville, C. & Sc L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
"'"Or soldiers," it could be added.
"'42 u.s.c. § § 1983, 1988.
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actions to coerce the state government to act or refrain from acting.
Moreover, the judicial machinery of coercion can be invoked by
private citizens. Traditional notions of a private law suit are maintained by requiring that the individual seeking to invoke the
judicial .machinery have a "private right" violated or some "personal
stake" in the outcome, i.e. some interest in the coercion that is different from the public's interest generally. Of course, this is now
caIIed standing to sue. Moreover, the fact that the suit is brought
against "persons" (usually those charged with executing the law)
has the distinct ring of a writ of mandamus.
A Baker v. Carr type case does not, therefore, present any "case
and controversy" problem. The judicial machinery of coercion is provided and authorized by the lawmaker. The problem concerns who
should invoke sud1 machinery and that is purely a question of standing. Nonetheless the Civil Rights Acts, when all the paraphernalia of
a private law suit is stripped away, allow a private citizen to sue a
government in the name of a higher law. There is also a higher law
over the federal government. Thus it is natural to ask: 1iVhy should
it not also be coerced into compliance with the higher law by the
judiciary? If some governments can be enjoined to do their constitutional duty, why not all governments since they are all under
the Constitution? At least, ought not the issue be examined the
same way the Civil Rights jurisdiction is examined, i.e. in terms
of "standing" to invoke the judicial machinery? Furthermore, this
reasoning goes, the Bill of Rights is a limitation on the federal
government and gives us "personal rights" against certain of its
actions. Moreover, in the area roughly delimited as "administrative
law", strictly public interests can be vindicated by strictly private
persons invoking the judicial machinery of coercion. If public interests can be so protected against violations by non-governmental
action {usually in the person of large corporation), then why cannot public interests (identified and ensh...iined in the Constitution)
likewise be protected against governmental action? Therefore, by
analogy to either Civil Rights or administrative law, the standing
issue also is resolved in favor of allo'wing (say) a federal taxpayer,
vindicating his own "right to freedom from establishmentarianism"
or the public's interest in non-establishment, to challenge a Congressional spending program. financed by appropriation from the general
revenues. And if the suit is not against Congress but against an
executive officer who will administer the spending act, why then all
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the more obviously it is just another lawsuit like mandamus or
injunction. And there you have Flast v. Cohen.a, And this despite
the· square holding to the contrary by· a unanimous Court in
Frothingham v. Mellon."' But wait, there the "right" or the "public
interest" for which vindication was sought was in the tenth amendment, not the Bill of Rights, so the analogies to standing from the
civil rights cases and the largely later developments in administrative law did not obtain. Thus it could be distinguished. Or so it
seemed.
However, the Court in F7.ast misconceived the problem and
talked about the wrong issue. First, the Court's holding in Frothingham v. Mellon was squarely rooted in the separation of powers.""
Second, the Court in Flast equated the "dispute" aspect of the case
and controversy limitation with the appropriateness of "issues"
for judicial resolution. Clearly the constitutional "issue" raised in
Flast v. Cohen is meet for judicial resolution, as was the constitutional "issue" raised in Frothingham. They were both also meet
for resolution by the political branches and had there been resolved.
Now, if a "judicial dispute" arose which raised those "issues," then,
of course, the Court would be duty bound to render its own independent judgment on the constitutional issue in resolving the dis"'392 U.S. 83 (1968).
84 262 u.s.- 447, 486 (1923).
85 "The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To
the legislative department has been committed the duty of making
laws; to the exerutive the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary
the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought
before the courts. The general rule is that neither department may invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct or
restrain the action of the other. We are not now ~peaking of the
merely ministerial duties of officials." Id. 488.
The reference to the "merely ministerial duties of officials" is of great
significance. The Court is here referring · to the function of the writ of man·
damns or the analogous .use of injunction in the federal courui to command
executive action. Of course, the traditional use of such remedies was not to
control discretion but to command action of the executive clearly enjoined by
law. His this power to enjoin executive action which, I would guess, persuaded
the Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), to assume (apparently unconsciously) that there existed judicial machinery of coerciqn, and to skip to the
que~tion of who could invoke it. But the court in Frothingham did not at all
a~ume it existed. In fact, the Court in Frothingham quite as casually assumed it
did not exist as the Court in Flast assumed it did exist; at least, that s=s a
fair inference firnm the c.asual language: "We are not speaking of the merely..."
(from the above quotation). But as pointed out in the text, the broad use of
the federal injunctfon to control state governments and the use of the word
"'standin1;(' with connotations borrowed from administrative law have entirely
changed the perspective of the _Supreme Court as to what the il!Sue is in "case
and controversy" qu~tions.
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pute. But by equating "issue" with "dispute" the Court slipped right
by the cornerstone of the holding in Frothingham, and into the
more commodious doctrine of standing, civil rights and administrative law style. But the latter cases can be seen as not truly raising
the case and controversy issue for, as pointed out above, each involved a judicial dispute, i.e. in an authorized application of governmental coercion to particular entities. The issue was only as to who
could invoke the judicial application. If the civil rights cases are
examined, it is seen that the organ, the Constitution, announcing
the "civil rights" did not itself create any remedy for their coerced
vindication. To be sure, in most instances, such rights are self.
executing in that they can be raised as defenses in state suits to coerce
compliance with some state policy. Thus if a positive legal right is
seen as an interest coupled with a governmental remedy, then the
three Civil War amendments created, full blown, positive legal
rights which could be ultimately policed by the Supreme Court with
its appellant supervision over state courts. But all three amendments
also empower Congress to enforce each amendment by appropriate
legislation. By virtue of such power, Congress authorized the federal
courts to enforce such rights by affirmative law suit. In other words
the federal government, under its constitutional authorization,
channeled, in time-honored fashion, its coercive activity through
the courts. Only here the coercion was directed at state government.
The existence of a judicial dispute is even plainer in the administrative law cases. There the organ, legislative act, announcing the.
remedy also identified the interest to be protected. Thus the whole
right (i.e. interest coupled with the judicially channeled coercion)
came from one source; there was no constitutional right and no
government to be coerced and thus no confusion as to the nature
of the "case in Law": it was a traditional one...
.. A further word must be added here as to the "administrative law" influence on the decision in Flast. Professor Louis L. Jaffe is, with little doubt the nation's foremost authority on judicial control of administrative action. He is very
much in favor of al1owing what he calls "non-Ho!feldian" plaintiffs to invoke the judicial machinery to protect public interests against private
persons who are regulated by the great federal administrative agencies. Traditionally, public interests have been protected by public attorneys or agents invoking the judicial machinery. The reasons for this are twofold: (I) by channeling the invocation of the court's powers through public agents, a multiplicity of
suits is avoided, and an initial responsible screening vi assumed, and; (2) the
conceptual difficulties with received notions that a private lawsuit demands
a personal '"right" or personal ·stake in the litigatimi in order ro state a cause
of action.
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Now in Flast v. Cohen, it was the Bill of Rights which created
the limitations. It contains no authorization to a superior government to coerce an inferior government to comply. Again these
limitations are usually seen as individual rights· because they can
be raised as defenses in a government suit to coerce compliance with
some federal policy. As was stated, all such governmental coercion,
not only by tradition but through constitutional command, must
be channeled through the courts, therefore all governmental action
that directly affects individuals is judicially supervised. If a constitutional issue is thereby raised the judiciary must pass on it unless
the issue itself is. appropriate only to political resolution (see below). But when there is no governmental coercion present or threatened, there can be no "judicial dispute." And that is what the
Court meant in Frothingham when it said:
"We have no power per se to review and annul acts of
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.
That question can be considered only when the justification for some. direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act.
Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. It amounts to
little more than the negative pawer to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the
way of the enforcement of a legal right. The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the
statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
in some indefinite way in common with people generally.
If a case for preventive relief be presented the court enIn many administrative-i:regulatory schemes Congress has authorized the
initiation of lawsuits by private persons who have little more than the public
interest at stake. Thus Congress. has authorized a sort of "private attorney gener•
al" (Judge Jerome Frank's phrase) to bring suit, simply ignoring the two traditional reasons for not doing so. Of rouu;e, Congress had every right to do this,
See FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Scenic Hudson Preserv!l,tion Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (Zd Cir. 1965), H<J\vever,
sometimes, the motive for sticking with tradition appears to stem mainly from
the judge's predisposition against the particular private litigants. See FCC v.
Sanders Brothers Radio Station, supra, at 20·2'1, (dissenting), opinion of Douglas
and Murphy J. J.) Professor Jaffe has waged a continuing battle against such
tradition-bound thinking, his latest effort aimed primarily at the second, or
~n~tual, ~ditio!lal rea:ion H?r not allowing private standing. Jaffe, The
C_ztizen as Litigant 111 Public Actzom: The Non-Ho!feldian or IdeologicoJ Plaintiff, 116 U. P3: L. Rev. 1033 (1968) • But the traditional reasons for public attorneys are sunply not relevant to the case and controversy limitation, and
Jaffe's advice on the latter matter is misconceived and has misled,
·
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joins., in effect, not the execution of the-slatute, but the acts
of -the _official, the _statute not withstanding. Looking
through the forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive department of government are executing and will execute an
act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this
we are to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority
over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, - an authority which plainly we do not possess.""'
~

If there be talk of standing in the above, it is standing to raise
constitutional issues when the government is currently coercing or
is threatening immediately to coerce the one seeking relief. But
"direct injury" must mean, when taken in conjunction with the
words ·"the court enjoins ... the acts of the official, the statute not
withstanding", that the government is about to take one's life, or to
take (or withhold) one's property or one's physical liberty in some
way. If "one's physical liberty" gives pause, then realize that if it is
other than physical liberty, the limitation is gone. For if liberty
means merely options for action, then nearly every act of government-regulatory, proprietary, or defensive-cuts down those options
and interferes with liberty. Of course deprivation of physical liberty
includes being banished from the country as well as imprisonment
or detention. Nearly every regulation of government, in order to
force compliance, carries with it a threat to physical possessions or
physical liberty. All actualizations of the threatened depriyation
give ri_se to judicial disputes. It is not the liberty that the regulation, or tax, or spending deprives one of that creates the judicial
controversy, it is the imminence of the coercion to compJy-"not the
execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute, notwithstanding." The deprivation of liberty in the broad sense may
well be, and probably will be, the subject of the constitutional
"issue" raised in the "judicial dispute" but it does not create the
.dispute.
Therefore, there was no more a judicial dispute in Flast v.
Cohen than there was in Frothingham v. Mellon. Therefore, there
was no jurisdiction. and therefore, the Court was unlikely, under
the Frothingham standard. ever to have an opportunity to pass on
the constitutionality of the act of Congress which, incidentally to its
main provisions, gives financial aid to Catholic schools.. This the
"'262 U.S. 447, 486, at 488 (1923) (emphasis added).

;,.,··=.=~-

~--·· ,,.,~~--....
- -
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Court could not abide." Now it is 1mdeniable that such an act is constitutionally suspect; but it is a question about which reasonable men
could differ." Congress had scrupled over the constitutional issue
with special care, and. as Mr. Justice Holmes obsei:ved, "legislatures
are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as the courts.".. But no matter to the present
Court: Why, if Congress could pass an unconstitutional act immune
from Supreme Court revision, Congress would, like a bunch of
children when the teacher's gone, run wild! 111
This same Court in another era carried such judicial hubris to
the brink of self destruction and prompted the following outburst
by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in dissent:
A tortured construction of the Constitution is not to be
justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless Con:
gressional spending which might occur if courts could not
prevent - expenditures which, even if they could be
thought to effect any national purpose, would be possible
only by action of a legislature lost to all sense of public responsibility. Such suppositions are addressed to the mind
accustomed to believe that it is the business of courts to sit
in judgment on the wisdom of legislative action. Courts
are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have the capacity to govern. Congress and the courts
both unhappily may falter or be mistaken in the performance of their constitutional duty. But interpretation of
our great charter of govcrnment which proceeds on any
assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of
our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the
three branches of government, or that it alone can save
them from destruction, is far more likely, in the long run,
to obliterate the constituent members of an indestructible
union of indestructjble states than the frank recognition
that language, even of a constitution, may mean what it
says: that the power to tax and spend includes the power to
relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment by conditional gifts of money."'
..Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98, 111 (concurring opinion of Douglas J.),
116 (concurring opinion of Fortas J.), 133 (dissenting opinion of Harlan J.,
referring to "Court's unarticulated premise"),
,. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1680 (1968)
and compare. with Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) and Urinan,
~oes State Aid to Church Related Colleges Constitute an Establishment of Reli491.L Jo:v.
g1on~-Reflections on the Marylalnd College Cases, 1967 UTAH
& Texas R. C.O. v. May, 19! U.S. 267, 270 (1904) .
Muisouri, Kansas, .,_
. . Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. S3, at 98 & n. 17; and id. at 107-114 (concurring
op1ruon of Douglas J.).
""United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. l, 87-88 (1936) (emphasis added).
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To reiterate, the Court can be independent and coequa1 ~'e,
cause it is "only a court of law exercising only judicial power/' Bii{
if the idea of "cases and controversies" can be expanded and c9'o/
tracted by the judges' subjective definition based on their idea of
the necessity of intervention, then the basis of allowing inclepi:n-(
dence and coequality is destroyed. Rather, the definition of "iw;e{
and controversies" must be independent of the judges. Of c01Jk~}
any standard that is independent of the judges must itself be fo. .
terpreted by the judges - but the word "independent" implles
much, at least, that is useful: the focus of the Court's interpreta1::ibn
must be on ascertaining what the creator of the standard intende~{;i·)'
the words when viewing the "ordinary" usage of the words iu th.I:
context of their use. And that is something entirely differel),t, ~~(
cognitive process, from deciding purely by one's own standard
appropriateness of judicial intervention.
· ,,
I have suggested that focus on the phrase, "in Law and Eqµ~"tf'>
provides some guide to the meaning of the words "cases" an.d
troversies" intended by the writers of the Constitution. But
Frankfurter did not use the phrase "in Law and Equity." It is wo:fi$§
of note that the opinion of the court in FlllSt v. Goh.en dism}i,i¢d<
Frankfurter's dictum, quoted above,"" by asserting that at the
the Constitution was drafted "the power of English .iudges to .ffilder advisory opinions was well established.".. However, this is ertt.µ-ely irrelevant to Frankfurter's statement. Nobody ever contett&ed)
that "advisory opinions" are rendered in "cases". In fact, the· ,Very<
words "advisory opinions" import an opposite meaning. Ad:vi$bry/
opinions lack finality - they bind no one, whereas no 011~: "tar}
doubt that a case at law or equity, by definition, does. Thus F'f~,;ik-}
furter was not saying jurisdiction is limited by the entire pra<;t;jce
of judges in colonial times, judicial and extrajudicial, but rai4er
by the judicial practice in colonial times. In neither Co/en'ltl~)v.
Miller nor Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath does Ft~('
furter make this entirely dear. Perhaps the phrase "in Law ipd.
Equity" would have helped.
" ••.•
Moreover, it was not restraint in allowing enlargement 9£ µti(
own power that prompted Chief Justice Jay, Chief Justice Taiijy,/
Mr. Justice Gray and others to decline the invitation to give adyi$~ry\
opinions. Nor was it the "lack of concreteness" that "sharJ?~nt

®s

}H

ie

•\'i~p;
e*tn
#file

"'See note '72, supra.
.. 392 U.S. 83, at 96 (1968).

........... ... .......... . ·..==.::.~ .c.::,
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issues", etc. Rather it was jealousy to protect the judicial power. In
Muskrat v. United States,.. and the cases it relied on, it was the
lack of finality, i.e. the fact that the advice need not be taken,
that prompted the refusal. The British law lords gave advice when
3csked, but they have never had the power to review the acts of
J{_ing or Parliament. The British judges are underlyings. Advisors
;u-e perforce underlings. Sovereigns give orders, not advice. But
once a "co mm and er" begins to give more advice, as John
Jay surely sensed, the authority of his commands is weakened. The
habit of obedience gives way when obedience need not always be
given. Of course, that was one fear voiced above (Section A) in
regard to the Court's giving orders to which it could not command
obedience. Courts in Anieric.a always settle disputes by giving orders,
some of which are commands that the order of another and coequal
pranch of government shall not be obeyed. But surely a corollary to
$at power, else the power cannot be reconciled with its grant (and
thus with democracy), is that it be used only to settle judicial disputes.
All this is to say that the definition of "cases and controversies",
as an objective jurisdictional limitation, is purely a function of the
separation of powers and the continuing justification of the Court
as a coequal branch. In Flast v. Cohen, the Court skirted the real
fasue when it shifted emphasis from standing as a way of expressing
}jm.itations on the kind of dispute it could settle, to one of limita·
tj_ons on the appropriate disputants, which led to considerations
merely of "concreteness". The reliance in Flast was then placed on
cases where jurisdiction to settle the kind of dispute was arguably
given by special grant of Congress and the issue was standing .in
what Bickel calls the "impure" sense. The inquiry in these "impure"
standing case is properly focused not on jurisdiction, but on the
discretionary question of appropriateness of the suitor in terms of
"personal stake" and appropriateness of the issues in terms of "ripeness" or "mootness".
It is significant that the two cases closest in point to Flast
were each squarely decided in terms of jurisdiction. These cases
were disingenuously distinguished in Flast by carving a rule arbund
them having nothing to do with separation of powers, which was
their basis. If Frothingham v. Mellon "talks" in certain places about
the policy behind the Court's decision in terms more appropriate
00

219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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to non.jurisdictional standing, that does not change the cleat hqJd~ )
ing or the main thrust of its rationale. Nor should it create dou~ts\
about the "true" nature of the holding. What it does show fs d~i)
tyranny of words and the confusions engendered by forcing:
i,
word, here "standing'', to signify several concepts.
·, ;
Perhaps it is too late in our history to resurrect the phra$e •1,i~)/
Law and Equity" (never mud1 used anyway) and ask it to do &¢r~/
vice in a cause apparently already lost. Marshall's philosophy· it>E<i
deciding a constitutional issue only if the Court happened tQ g~li.t\
in the course of its regular judicial duties has given way, appareittty,:}:
to one of taking jurisdiction if the Court thinks the constitlltiotl,'.aJ fo
issue is. important. The most discouraging thing about Flast is
the lone dissenter, Justice Harlan, did not predicate his opinion.·~~/
want of jurisdiction.
·. ;t <:.
And what does Flast v. Cohen "teach"? It teaches the idea tha(
constitutional issues must be decided by the Supreme Court
all possible; that the other branches of government cannot be trus'~¢~(
with any part of this sacred task. Because of the esoteric Ilp,.ture!"'~f<
standing and jurisdiction, Flast is bench.and-bar-focused teadH~JiJ
But the Flast example cannot help but mightily reinforce,....::i:t
for what Professor Dahl calls the "political stratum" - the pat(~µ
of judicial ubiguity and potency. If you lose in the Iegislatur¢, g~.j~)
the courts. The legislatures are staffed with children· anyw?,y. : : {,'
Did Flast not help teach the losers in Roane County whei'¢•
g<:ii? Did it not add to the impression the West Virginia OJ#h f/:
received, that it ought to let them in? And did it not help te:=tdi: ~,; ?
court to presume to decide the political issue involved? Adami'~{/
the Parable, might have said:

iie

df;t))

ii/~t/

le'~~1::

J>\ )

Samuel, we never cooperated in that area before and J
didn't specially provide for it here, though I thought of it.
I worried within myself very long and hard because I kllew
I would not have your guidance. Now without my say so
you volunteer your advice and <lain to make it a command,
My rule was: My servants each in their place~ none master
of the other, none master of me. Perhaps Guardian was too
large a word for you. You have become proud and arrogant
- and you spoke of "overweening other servants."

The "political question" limitation.
,, /
Since the Court has only judicial power it cannot answer politf~; /
cal questions. Moreover since its having only judicial
(2)
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cQpstitutional predicate of its being independent and coequal (i.e.

of the Court's having the power of "judicial review"}, it has no
constitutional right to attempt to answer political questions. As
w,i,s pointed out above, that means it has no power to settle disputes
that tum on the resolution of political questions, i.e. jurisdiction
initially given, assuming a "case or controversy", is lost. In the usual
case, then, existence 0£ a crucial political question is not a matter
of self-restraint, it is a question of power. This does not avoid the
bard question of what a non-justiciable political question is. And
to answer that question requires a high order of judgment because
t> tp.e standard is so elusive and vague."' But just because broad discre::tion must be exercised to answer the question, the question itself
sllould not change. But it has. And this change in the underlying
q1;1estion from one of jurisdiction to the appropriateness of its exercise has changed the answer-for, if you will pardon the expression,
"ask a flabby question, you get a flabby answer."
For example, would it not have made a difference in Baker v.
Cari" that Coleg;rove v. Green"' had been decided squarely in terms
•' .of jurisdiction? In other words, if the;: Court in Baker had approach. ei,i the "palitical question" issue as one of jurisdiction, would it not
have viewed that issue differently? Would it not have constrained
tb;e Court to carve out a narrow rule? Such constraint should come
frmn the corollary to viewing justiciability as jurisdictional. In
Marshall's famous words: "We have no more right to decline jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.""' Thus once
""The Court in B<Xkerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), begins its discussion of the
pq]itical question doctrine by stating that it has "attributes which, in various
settings, diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness."
Id. at 210. But the OJurt does conclude with the following "test":
"Prominent on the sunnce of any case held to involve a political
question is found [11 a textually demonstrable constitutional commit·
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [21 a lack. of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
· .[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impoo:sibility of
a. court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lad
Qf respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or [6J the Potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounceIQ.ellts by various departments on one question." Id. at 217. I do not
undertake here a general discussion of the political question doctrineground heavily plowed in legal literature.
"'Id.
" 328- U
549 (1946) .
.. Gohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821).

.s.
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'

'

.;~

Carr type case is found to be within the Court's jurisdic.
tion, all such cases must be taken unless distinguishable, and such
taking would be entirely a function of the standard by which the·
prototype was let in. Thus rigor in defining the jurisdictional
standard will be compelled or else the Court will find itself em, ...
barrassed into taking cases it really does not think appropriate, foi'··r:
any one of the various "discretionary" reasons given in Baker v.' "''
Carr for not getting involved in the nation's politics. Such a rigoroU$
and narrow rule could have been fashioned in Baker v. Carr and it .,; \
would have avoided both the flabbiness of the present justiciabilitf/}/
standard and the narrowness and simplicity of the rule on the ····
merits, "one in.an, one vote", which rule was a betrayal of the original
thrust, rationale and aim of Baker and grossly oversimplified a... ,;
complex problem.10•
Because Baker so clearly illustrates the lesson of judicial over.
reaching, ~t must again be reiterated that "one man, one vote" as 1(
rule for apportioning legislative representation implies a particular
kind of republican government and one which is not reflected
by the way the national republic is constituted. The result of ovet•. , >
reaching in the resolution of the "political question" issue in Baker, · ?
led ineluctably to that standard which is premised in the resolution, ·' ·
of as clear a Guaranty Clause issue as could be framed. The pre\,:J :
mises and conclusion were not "given 'republican government' an&·.''. ·.·
'equal protection of the laws' then a particular type of republican: '
government is implied, i.e. representatives as pure delegates." That
would be defensible as not a Guaranty Clause decision. Rather th~,,;~·
premises and conclusion were "given a particular type of republicai"i.
government" called "pure delegate" and given "equal protection'\
then "one man, one vote" follows.'"'- But the Court got to that pro,.
See discussion in Part I of this article, 72 W. VA. REv. l, 23-31.
""Remember, all that "equal protection of the law:." means ordinarily is:
rational classification for different treatment. Such classification is perforce not
rational if based on invidiousness, i.e., on prejudice which is nearly always assum~
ed to be ixrationaL No such invidiousness can be found or has ever been found
in the apportionment cases. The 0:mrt as much as admitted in Baker that there
are many rational plans for apportionment. The issue was whether or not th¢
Tennessee appoin_tment scheme under attack in the underlying "merits" case in
Baker "reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action". Baker v.
Carr, 369 rns. 186, at 226 (1962) (emphasis in original) • Thus republican
government and equal protection demand only a rational plan, and which of
several "rational p1ans" is to be the plan is a question to be decided m the political arena. Only if a particular theory of "republican government is adopted as.
.the only allowable "meaning" of republican government, and that theory is
pure delegate or pure "reflector", does the oonjunction with equal-protectionrationality demand mathematically equal population districts,
100
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position backwards and have yet to acknowledge even that they got
there at all. By not having a dear standard to justify their intervention and by using a standard for non-justiability stated in terms
of negatives, one of which (and apparently the only one of immediate relevance for the Court) was "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it", the majority was impelled
toward finding a manageable standard for resolving the constitutional issue- Thus to prove, after the fact, that the issue was
justiciable, they found the only standard a court could both manage
and discover, "one man, one vote'', and that standard implies a
particular theory of republican government or it makes no sense as a
standard for apportionment. In a nutshell, the felt exigencies of
justicibility as enunciated in Baker and not in the equal protection
clause, drove the Court to "one man, one vote". "One man, one vote"
as a rule for apportionment implies pure-delegate-type representation and that in turn implies a Guaranty Clause decision. Thus the
exigencies of justiciability led inexorably to a decision the Court
still says is non-fµsticiable. If this is correct, then Holmes was indeed right: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.''
Besides violating the limitations on power that inhere in the
interdependence of the attributes of judiciality, independence, and
coequality, and making for vague, almost non-standard, standards,
the discretionary political question doctrine has another failing.
For it is one thing to be able to define the limits of one's own
power; it is another thing entirely to determine that one has the
power but one chooses to refrain from using it because of this or
that reason which is solely within one's own discretioIL Some theologians define God's power in these terms: "He could do anything
but He is letting you muck around to test you", or for some other
reason, perhaps known only to Him. What is suggested here, if a
little too flatly, is that the Court's exercise of a broad discretion to
abstain or intervene is the attribution to itself of a far greater
power than the power to determine its own jurisdiction. And this
cannot help but teach, as it apparently did in Lance v. Board of
Education, very subtly to be sure, a sort of judicial omniscience and
omnipotence, a sort of "we-will-answer-your-prayer-if-only-you-prayferven tly-enough" attitude. The only difficulty with this is that
courts have neither of these two godlike attributes and that this
type of "prayer" stultifies needed self-help through democratic
persuasion.
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For example, the problem of air and water pollution fairly
shouts for solution. Yet many of the leaders, the potential persua~
ders and political consensus-makers, talk about finding a constitu,
tional right to clean air and water, probably somewhere in the
etheral confines of the ninth amendment. "If we only pray long and.
ardently, sincerely and plaintively, the Court will sooner or later
answer our prayer". What remedy the Court could fashion, what
standard it could invoke, seems to be beside the point. After all, in
Baker the Court cavalierly announced: "Beyond noting that we
have no cause at this stage to doubt that the District Court will be
able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found;
it is improper now to· consider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial.""'" Quite frankly, to add
a personal note, the doomsday ecologists''" have frightened me.
Pollution should be the burning issue of our day.• One that should
easily arouse that "popular conscience that sears the conscience ~f
the people's representatives.'".. By looking to the courts for federal
judicial solution, the reformers not only waste breath in the wrong
forum, but tend to frame the issues in absolutist terms - the rhetoric
of "constitutional rights." Such rhetoric, tending to the dogmatic,
puts off the as yet unpersuaded and impedes the formation of a
politically workable consensus. The sweet voice of reason is requir·
ed to form political majorities, passionately voiced reason perhaps,
but altogether in a spirit of modernation, of listening as well as
talking, urgent but patient.'.. Exposing and illucidating the problem in terms of quantity and the 'people's interest, exploring the
costs of solution, and balancing the two, that is what must be
done. And until that is done no court will have the tools to solve
, .. Baker v. Oairr, 369 U.S. 186, 195 {1962).

""See e.g.,
100 Baker

PAUL EHRLICH, Eco-GATA5Ill.OPME (1969). " No pun intended.
v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186, 270 (1962)
(dissenting
opinion of Frank·

furter J.).
"""It would be immoderate of me not to add that much of the anti-pollu·
tion rhetoric is informed by the "spirit of moderation". For example the very
popular book The Populatioo Bomb l>y Dr. Paul Ehrlich is full of "passionately
voiced reason", "urgent but patient." B.ut, it is worthy of note that Dr. Ehrli.ch,
in a chapter called "What can you do", lists 15 "inalieruihle rights" to answer
someone who says he has "an 'inalienable right' to have as ma.ny children as one
wants." Dr. Ehrlich includes "the right to eat meat" and "the right to silence"
in his tongue-in-cheek list, which he feels one must make "as long as the invention
,of inalienable rights is in vogue." (p. 187) Dr. Ehrlich'& little joke is that the
best way to answer nonsense is by counter nonsense or "a silly argument deserves
a silly rebuttal." But the publisher, whose .business it is to sell books, and who
therefore is expert a,t measuring and knowing the "in" vogue, took the list of
rights, culled out the obviously facetious, a:nd printed it on the back of the paperback publication as M«nkind's Inalienable Rights.
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the problem, nor ought to attempt to exercise its otherwise feeble
powers.
To return to Baker v. Carr, a narrow rule could have been
fashioned to solve the genuine palitical impasse that the Court saw
through the narrow lens of the case at bar. Moreover, such rule
follows from a strict reading of the then obtaining political question
ooctrine and is principled, i.e. it is reasonable, neutral, and can be
consistently applied. That rule is:
If a suitor claiming the denial of equal protection of the
laws under a federal jurisdictional statute [here 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or § 1988 J is a member of an identifiable class of citizens who are denied equal treatment, and such denial is based on no identifiable state policy but is in fact in defiance of
identifiable state policy and rests on inertia or engrained
abuse of political power, then even if the inequality of
treatment is a political question (and thus perforce not a
judicial question) it becomes a judicial question if and
only if the inertia or engrained abuse of power are convincingly demonstrated both by history and the intrinsic
nature of the problem to be not amenable to political solution; and it is a judicial question only to the extent that it
is not so amenable and remains one only until such political problem is made amenable to political solution.

Such a predication of jurisdiction follows from a premise that
there is a constitutional right here, a right from the equal protection
clause to a reasonable classification and a second premise, the premise of necessity, a premise that is consistent with coequality. It is
that constitutional rights must have some governmental remedy.
Then if the governmental remedy is ordinarily and properly for the
"political" government because it involves a political question and
if the political remedy for the political question is, as a practical
matter (as defined in the rule), unavailable, then it is meet for
judicial remedy and thus becomes a judicial question, but only to
restore the political remedy and only to the extent that a judicial
remedy c_an do this. This still allows a political solution to the
basic political question concerning the constitutional righ[. In
Baker, the basic political question was: which of a myriad of possible
"reasonable" apportionment plans based on various definitions of
"republica)'l government" (which definitions are admittedly political) was to be the basis of the apportionment plan under attack?
Under the rule I suggest, the Court could order only that either the
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state adhere to its own policy, long ignored, or develop some plan
that has an appearance other than randomness.
Had the Court done this, it could have broken the political
logjam but still allowed the ordinary political processes to solve the
problem of which particular apportionment plan was most in accord
with the polity's idea of a just government. Thus it would not have
set an example reinforcing the pattern of judicial self-apotheosis:
the seeming omnicompetence which in the long run is, as Frankfurter said, but "sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to be
disappointing to the hope."'..

(3) The. "neutral principle" limitation.
A court of law, by definition, has no force or will of its own,
but only judgment. It follows, of course, that a court in exercising
its judsdiction to resolve controve:rsies cannot make the law to
cover the case, except, as Holmes suggested, interstitially. It interprets
the law given by the lawmaker. In the constitutional context, the
lawmaker is the people and the law made is the written constitution.
In common law countries, where much of the private law (at least
until recently) is unwritten, the function of a court as law interpreter and not lawmaker is often blurred and sometimes confused.
For, as legal realists are wont to point out, when one has to discover the law without the aid of any writing, one appears to be left
much more at large to declare as rules norms emanating from one's
personal notion of justice, and that, of course, is what lawmakers
do, i.e., enact as laws that which the collective will (assuming democracy) asserts is the collective will's notion of justice. Perhaps the
· realization that a judge is left too much at large with his own predilections where there is no written law has created the unique
respect of common law courts for stare decisis. At least old decisions
are written. In civil law countries the problem of separating the
functions of legislators and judges has been obviated to a large extent by elaborately written codes. Likewise, in interpreting a written constitution, this distinction between interpreting and making
law ought to be fairly obvious and therefore faithfully kept. It was
on the faith that it could be kept that the Court was made coequal
and independent, for it had no "Will but only judgment."
But in a common law country with a written constitution two
factors work counter to seeing this distinction. One is the common
,.. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, at 270 (1962).
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law judicial tradition, mentioned above. The other is that a written
constitution is not an elaborate code but a set of fairly general
precepts. As Marshall said, it is a writing "intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs.""" "We must never forget," Marshall seminally
intoned in the same opinion, "it is a constitution we are expounding.""" Thus the interstices are great. Nonetheless the Constitution is
written law and interpretation of the Constitution must come from
interpretation of the written word. Professor Freund, in the best
defense that can be made of Justice Black's absolutist dogma, refers
to Black's insistence on giving the written word its "natural meaning" ..... "Natural meaning" is a better phrase than "plain meaning"
f.or characterizing the process of interpreting the general words of the
Constitution. "Plain meaning'' has something of old-fashioned platonic idealism about it, suggesting, perhaps, that there is a perfect
form, say, of "freedom of speech", independent of the context or
particular use of the phrase. This rankles those schooled in more
modem philosophy or in modem psychology. "Natural meaning",
on the other hand, implies the common sense understanding of the
words, what to the vast number of people is the "natural" usage of
the words. It suggests the idea that any interpretation of written
words must seem to the ordinarily intelligent person to be natural,
not forced or, to put it figuratively, the interpretation must appear
to come as if "spontaneously" from the written word.1'0
Thus, possessing only "judgment" and no "will" of its own,
a court of law as a predicate of its grant of power, is limited to the
"natural meaning'-' of the words in the Constitution. Yet, something
more is implied in the idea that the Supreme Court is a court of
law. The quality of a court's intersticial particularization of a vague
precept must have about it the distinct flavor of law, as opposed to
fiat. As Professor Wechsler summed up his famous lecture on
"neutral principles":

. In [exercising the power to review the action of the
other branches in the light of constitutional provisions] ...
they are bound to function otherwise than as a naked
,., McCollough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Whea.t.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis
in original) .
""'Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
"'"Freund; Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
467, 468-469 (1967).
" 0 See teir.t accompanying footnotes !'14-40, supra.
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power organ; they participate as courts of law. This calls for
facing how determinations of this kind can be asserted to
have any legal quality. The answer, I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are - or are obliged to be - entirely
principled. A principled decision, in the sense I have in
mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the
issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their
neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.
When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for
overturning value choices of the other branches of government,· or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive.
Otherwise, as Holmes said in his first opinion for the Court,
"a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan
of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions ...""'
No doubt this is itself a laudable, even a necessary, principle for
a court of law to follow in announcing the rule for the case. If a
court's decision is to appear to flow from law and not from idiosyncratic notions of justice that fit a specific case alone, then it must
make "an intellectually coherent statement of the reason for a result
which in like cases will produce a like result, whether or not it is
immediately agreeable or expedient."'"'
However, this principle is much easier to state than to apply.
Professor Bickel, in explicating Professor Wechsler, cites Shelton v.
Tucker"' as an example of the Court's failure to follow the rule of
the neutral principle.''" At the same time he criticizes Mr. Wechsler's
citing of the school desegration cases as such an example."" However, I think Professor Bickel is wrong about Shelton. On careful
reading of Shelton one is struck by two things: (1) It takes no
imagination to see that an affidavit requiring the disclosure of all
associational activity within the past five· years by a public school
teacher hired on a year-to-year basis is violative of the fundamental
constitutional ideal of freedom of association. (2} Mr. Justice
Stewart's opinion for the majority is not a model of articulate explication of the ideal as applied. I would guess the case was too easy
for Justice Stewart and as a result he too glibly set forth the Court's

'-"'Wechsler, supra note 14, at 19.
'"' :Sickel, supra note 3, at 59.
m 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
"' Bickel, supra note ll. at 51-55.
~ Id. at 56-58.
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rationale of decision; In fact, by certain statements, he almost
creates a noU"rule, i.e., one without intellectual coherence.1J•
Despite the obvious blemishes in the opinion, one can induce
from it a principled rule: when a state makes an inquiry of any of its
public employees, which inquiry will necessarily interfere with the
right of free association, a right which "lies at the foundation of a
free society", then the inquiry must be limited to that which can
reasonably achieve whatever legitimate purpose or purposes the
state might have for its inquiry. Such a principle has nothing to do
with Shelton, the particular plaintiff, or the NAACP, the particular
association that would by the inquiry be interfered with. Now the
principle in application requires determination of these material
facts: (I) Will the particular inquiry necessarily interfere with
free association, and;· (2) What legitimate purposes might the
state have for such inquiry, and; (3) Were other less restrictive alternatives available that could reasonably achieve such legitimate
purpose or purposes? The majority concluded that an inquiry which
seeks disclosure of all organizational associations. within the last five,
years where some associations m~y perforce be extremely unpopular
and where the inquiring authority can discharge the public employee from valuahie employment without notice, charges, or an
opportunity to explain, then such lawful hut unpopular associations
will, in any common sense understanding of human nature,
necessarily inhibit such association."' It also concluded that the legits
imate pu:rpose a state could have for such inquiry was to ascertain
whether or not the time taken up by such associations might interfere with the employee's having ample time properly to discharge

n,;For instance, the opinion states that a state may inquire of some teachers,
all associations, and of all teachers, some associations; but not of all teachers,
all associations. But he never explains how one is to discover the "some teachers"
of whom unlimited inquiry can be made. His explanation that not all teachers
can have all associations inquired into is premised on the conclusion that
"many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's
occpuational competence oc fitness." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487488
(1960). That premise does not help explain "some teachers, all associations"
unless one assumes he meant either that (1) !;(J)lle teachers will belong only to
groups about whkh inquiry is permissible, or (2) after. initial screening some
teachers will have disclosed matter which would allow a further complete screeni~, or (3) the state could pick some teachers at random to make the "all associations" inquiry, like the Internal Revenue Service's random audit Policy. (1)
and (3) run from silly to absurd, so (2) is elected. The problem is that one has
!o :·~ume" his meaning and without such explanatory assumption the opinion
1s incoherent.
'" Id. at 486-4S.7.
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his employment"" and whether or not the employee had improper
associations.11" It further concluded that the inquiry was. far
broader than was necessary reasonably to achieve either of these
purpo.5es""' - which by implication means that the state could have
achieved these purposes by asking the number of outside associations, the time spent with each and whether any were illegal or
"illegality-teaching." ... = The latter question can be asked either
by defining various unlawful categories and asking if any organization associated with fits the definition, or by listing the taboo
groups (as the federal goverrunent does) and asking whether the
employee belongs to any of them.
This examination of Shelton v. Tucker illustrates two points:
First, inarticulately written opinions are not necessarily unprincipled decisions. They border on the unprincipled, because the
opinion itself lacks intellectual coherence. But if a principled reason
for the decision can be evolved and is fairly implicit in what is
written, including the cases cited in support thereof, then some
stumbling, seeming contradictions (or is it counter dictions?) shotild
be overlooked. I will admit that this explanation is not entirely ·satisfactory. We expect from courts of law (and think we have a right
to expect in every instance) clear, logical, generalized rules to ex-.
plain their holdings. But, of course, this does not obtain and never
has obtained. Any lawyer who has stumbled through the common
110 Id. at 487. "[The question] is not whether teachers can be asked how many
organi:i;ations they belong to. or how much time they spend in organizational
activity."
,.,,. Id. at 485 (reference to "right of state to investigate competence and.
fitness" of teachers because teachers work in a ''sensitive area" and they shape
"the attitudes of young minds") . "Improper associations" would be those relevant
to such "fitness" "to shape young minds" and such relevance would be limited
by the constitutional standards gleaned from such cases as NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). It would probably include organizations set up
for illegal pur'1f>oses or that advocate or teach illegal means of accomplishing
their purposes. Membership itself need not be illegal or the organization unlaw·
l!ul, since the state, as an employer, has broader discretion as to whom it hires
to mold its young people's minds than it would as to direct control of speech
or organizations. Thus organi:iational memooship that would bear a sub·
stantial nexus to showing the ki.nd of "ideas" a teacher might teach about illegal
canduct would be relevant. But since the Court in Shelton quotes (at 487)
Sweez:y v. New Hampshire, supra, that "[tleachei:s and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate..." and Wieman v. Updegraff,
supra, to the same effect, the C.ourt seems to imply that such illegal or illegality•
teaching organizations would be the only ones about which the state could make
specific inquiry.
""'Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479,488 (1960).
$ See note 119, supra.
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law precedents in a particular jurisdiction to ascertain the controlling principle for his case has almost instinctively used such a rule
as here outlined for inferring principles from opinions. Not to do
so would not only make the process of using precedents extremely
difficult, it would make it absurd. Most judges often fail to be
logical or clear, and even the best sometimes do - even Homer
sometimes nods."'' We expect and generally get a better performance
from the Supreme Court than from our other courts. But even
with this highest Court, the requirement of principled decisions
must be mitigated to allow for human fallibility.
The second point is that if intuition (or some such non-verbalized cognition) tells one that the particular result in a case is in
accord with (say} "liberal" notions of justice, but notions that are
vague, almost "feelings", and no articulate explanation is made,
one is inclined to. conclude, as Bickel did with Shelton v. Tucker,
that the decision is merely the result of the court's desire to get a
particular just result without the application of a generalized principle."" In Shelton, an implicit inference could be attributed to the
majority. It is that Arkansas's primary motive for requiring the disclosure affidavit was to ferret out members of the NAACP in order
to fire them or at least to discourage, by an implied threa~, membership by teachers in Negro rights organizations. If this had been
the avowed legislative purpose, or the only conceivable purpose for
such disclosure, the case would have been easy."• But it was not and
the Court recognized this. Nonetheless, the Court reached the result
it would have reached had it been able expressly to find such sole purpose and its articulation of a principled ground £or ihe result was
muddled. Therefore, one is tempted to conclude that individual
justice based on the judge's intuition was being dispensed, not
principled line-drawing. Now if the Court had simply said, "justice
in this case requires that Mr. Shelton not have to file the affidavit",
that conclusion would be warranted. Or it would be warranted
if the Court had said or implied, "despite our holding in such
and such, and despite our inability to distinguish that case, and despite its being the law, we know what's going on here and will not
tolerate it." In either event, the Court would have been acting like
""So Hand said of Holmes to characterize the creation by Holmes of the
"clear and present danger" test. Hand, Bill of Rights, 59 (Atbeneum ed. 1965).
""'See the first paragraph of dissent by Harlan J., in Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 496 (1960).
'""See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) .
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persons exercising certain executive functions, such as a prosecutor
deciding which crimes not to prosecute, or like a legislature passing
a hill granting special aid to certain people (e.g. war veterans, flood
victims) or deciding to put a road or park in this place and not
another: decisions based on no discoverable or articulatable prin.
ciple but seemingly demanded by vague notions of justice, exigent
circumstance, political compromise or the like. But such was not
the case in the Shelton opinion and the temptati_on to the easy
reading should have been resisted.
On the other hand, a case that seems to me to violate Mr.
Wechsler's rule, and was therefore not an authorized answer to the
constitutional question posed, is the opinion for the Court by Mr.
Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut."'" I am not here
quarreling over whether or not the "right of privacy" is a constitu.
tionaI ideal either in its fundamentalness or in its being attributable
to the text of the Constitution. Rather my quarrel is with the "rule"
announced to govern the case and dictate the result. All of the
opinions""' struggle to find the "right" (i.e. the constitutionally protected interest) purportedly violated by the Connecticut statute.
All of them acknowledge that such interest is not absolute. That is,
the interest can be invaded by state regulation to protect other interests of the public. But the Douglas opinion makes only a cryptic
finding that the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute sweeps too
broadly and thus has a constitutionally impermissible "impact'' on
the right."" In effect he announced that there is a right at large in
this land, fundamental, but not absolute, any invasion of which
must give pause for careful scrutiny but "if you want to predict
beforehand what the result of our scrutiny will be, better read biographies of the judges to discover their prepossessions because we
have no rule for such examination." Had the Court said, as Justice
Goldberg's opinion comes close to saying, that the state may never
,.. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"" There are five opinions in addition to Douglas': supplemental concurring
opinion by Goldberg joined by Brennan and Warren; separate, "concurring in
the judgment" opinions by Harlan and White; and reciprocating dissenting opin·
ions by Black and Stewart.
==Griswo1d v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Justice Goldberg's
separate opinion does state that the individual interest can be overbalanced only
by a "compelling'' state interest and that the law must be "neces.sary" to the
protection of such interest and "not merely rationally related" to its protection.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). :Sut he concludes with the statement:
..Gonnecticut cannot constitutionally abridge this fundamental right [to marital
privacyJ. . :• This statement would seem to make the right absolute.
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pass a law interfering with marital privacy,""' a principle would be
apparent. It does not matter that a principled reason could have
been given, if in fact none was given or fairly implied.""' To say that
a law has an impermissible impact on a right is to give no guidance, no rule for legislatures to follow. It is like a prosecutor saying,
"Well, taking into account all the circumstances here, I am not
going to prosecute the perpetrator of this particular crime." Such
decision may give insight into the particular sense of justice of
the prosecutor, perhaps into hfa "personality", which may help predict how he feels and will behave in the future, but it yields no
standard to govern his future behavior.
Nor does the ''compelling interest doctrine" suggested by the
Goldberg opinion"• yield a guiding principle; Under this doctrine,
the purported principle for balancing interests is :that when a litigant's interest is found to be fundamental (i.e., constitutionaUy
protected) then the state's countervailing int_erest must be compelling. But compelling to whom is the question. The answer apparently is "compelling to us judges." But no guidance is given as
to what will appear to be compelling to the judges. If the Court
traces from the roots up the value of the individual's asserted interest, but then fails to demonstrate why the state's interest is not
compelling, there is no principle-there is only subjective judgment.
What has happened, I will be so bold as to suggest, is that the
Court feels the compulsion to pass on the substance of legislative
action, but has rejected so thoroughly the substantive due process
doctrine that balanced individual against state interests, that it no
longer can "talk." in language that might even suggest that "abhor""'See note 127, supra.
""'Justice Douglas does hint at a principle in saying "[s]uch a law cannot
stand in light of the :familar principle, so often applied by this court, that a
'governmental purpose to eontrol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and the...-eby invade the area of protected freedoms.' Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 485 (1965) . Is that a principle? 'lt so, is it more
than the ''principle" that a state cannot pass u~stitutional laws? Does it also
say that when a law invades constitutionally protected interests it can do so only
so far as ( (a) absolutely, (b) reasonably, (c) arguably) necessary to achieve a
( (a) vital, (b) necessary. (c) laudab1e but not necessary, (d) merely legitimate)
state purpose? Or does it say simply that the state may not in any way "invade
the area of protected freedoms," i.!e., may not, no matter how vital the interest.
interfere with· marital privacy? I am sugges,ting that not only is the quoted
statement equivocal on its own terros, but that since the opinion does not ev_en
casually examine the state's interest, it gives no help in tightening the lOOBe
language.
""' See not.e 127. supra.
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rent" doctrine. No one will gainsay the past abuse of that
doctrine."' Nor is there any argument that much of the abuse came
from an overly subjective conclusion as to which "liberty" or indivi.
dual right was sufficient to overtutn the legislative or public inter-,
est and a too cavalier treatment of the initial legislative balancing."" ,
So a salutory shift in emphasis took place with the advent of the
Roosevelt majority. The new emphasis on finding an objective,
fundamentalness of the challenging litigant's interest led some~
most acutely Mr. Justice Black, to the Bill of Rights as that objective
sign of fundamentalness. Since the language of most of the Bill of
Rights, with the possible exception of the fourth amendment, does, · ·
not appear to yield a balancing principle, once the right is located
therein the state's interest has to give way. "Rights analysis," as
opposed to balancing, is perfectly acceptable in the area of procedure. If one· has a "right" to a certain prescribed procedure
before something else can happen to one, then the question is..
simply: Did the state do what it was commanded to do?'.. However,
it is not nearly as acceptable when the substance of the law is being
challenged, as is evidenced by the great and continuing debate over
"balancing" in the first amendment area. When substantive law
is challenged as (say) an abridgment of the freedom of speech,
then analysis of the words "abridgment" and "freedom of speech';
make necessary an examination of the purpose of the law claimed
to interfere, the nature of the speech interfered with. how much it
is interfered with, and how it is interfered with. Any conclusion as
to whether or not there is an "abridgment of freedom of speech"
requires balancing: privacy, reputation, truth or morality, versus
pure speech (libel and obscenity cases); order versus pure speech
(incitement cases), etc.""
'"' See text accompanying notes 49-50, supra.
""'See text accompanying notes 51-57, supra.
,.. Those "duties" are given only in a "thou shalt not" context. They are
not sole affirmative commands to government, e.g., that the state must provide
welfare. Rather they are conditional commands, i.e;, if the smte does X, then
it must do Y. For example, if the state pu1nishes for crimle, then it must give
notice, hearing, etc.
"" There are some cases that can be put hypothetically which seem to require
no balancing. For instance, if Congress should pass a law saying. "in the interest
of law and order, no one may ma!<e a speech on a college campus that criticizes
the President's war policy or the war in Vietnam,{' clearly it would abridge
freedom of speech. No balancing needed-obviously! Now imagine that· Congress
passes another law; "no one shall make a speech which urges individuals
to assassinate the President, or which teaches the propriety of killing or of
blowing up buildings to bring about refonn." Clearly, this is a limitation on
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Of course there is no nice clean dichotomy between judicial
review of procedural and substantive law. But it is suggested that in
general when governmental action is challenged for failure to do
something, it is sensible to focus on the "right" to have it done, and
while the process of determing the right requires a kind of balancing, such balancing does not require an examination of the
"q~ality" of what the government is doing-that is, of the values served by the governmental action or the public interest protectedbut rather with the quantz'ty of the interference with the indivM.ual."" Professor Bickel points out that procedural decisions "deal
with the 'how' of governmental action, whereas substantive decisions
go to ends, dealing with the what.' """ And in determining the
"how", the only balancing is as against the "how much" on the
other side."' The examination of the "what'' of governmental
action (i.e., the determination of whether or not it can be done at all)
necessarily involves weighing competing values, examining competing interests. The first amendment helps to identify the individual's interests, it helps establish a hierarchy of values, but despite
speech. But is it unconstitutional? Is it an "abridgment'' of "freedom of spc,ech"?J
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (19.51) (first paragraph of dissent by
Douglas) . At least, it should give pause, a pause to consciously weigh the interests involved. I suggest that there was balancing in the rm:st hypothet as· well
but that it was over in the twinkling of an eye. The balancing was between the
interest in order ancl the interest in free speech. While the governmental purpose is legitimate, jn the name of order all speech could be suppressed; that is
the standard excuse m dictatorship!. Therefore, the quantity of disorder that
will be caused must be weighed against the quantity of the interference with
spe~. In the first hypothetical case, the quantity of disorder that will be caused
is obviously problematical, as is the causal link itself. The quantity of the interference with speech, on the other hanrl, is so large and direct that to state
its magnitude would require resort to truisms about a free society. The imbalance
Jiere is so obvious we don't even think about it.
The current rule for applying the .ideal, .tireedom of speech, r.o concrete
situations ill the "clear and present danger test." See Bradenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969). That is, of course, a balancing test. In a world in which
speech is such a powerful guad to action, in which lille, bodily integrity, and
property are so highly valued, and wheFe men are practical enough to get
through the day, some such balancing test is simply inevitable. Ill one knows
that N act. will cause X destruction, and knows that A is about to do N. as an
ordinary h~man problem-solver, one stops A. If N is "speech" which will came
X d~truc.t1on,. what is the difference? If the causal Hnk is really certain, only
monkish 1deal1sm would allow the speech. Ours is a practical nation, which
presupposes a practical particularization of ideals. (See text below in Section C
(2).) See, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 117 (1970).
,.. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
""' Bickel, supra note 3, at 233.
• ""Com.pare the procedural rights aff.orded an accused charged with a
cap1tal felony with those afforded in cases of non-capital felony, misdemeanor,
mmor offense.
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its absolutist language, it is no simple mechanical rule in anything',
like the sense of (say) "the right. .. to be confronted with the wit: ,
nesses against him" in any criminal prosecution.
This balancing is not unlike the examination of a statute fot
reasonableness under the old .mbstantive due process standard. The,
judges most committed to throwing out substantive due process
refused to "balance away" first amendment rights."' Thus, when
reviewing state action under the fourteenth amendment, these
judges will not only not talk. in terms of reasonableness, but will also
insist on finding a very fundamental human right (hopefully
from the Bill of Rights) on the individual litigant's side, and if
it is found, refuse openly to consider countervailing state interest::,,; ·
Couple this with the felt need to strike down "uncommonly silly"';.
state laws, and two things occur which violate the limitation dis,
cussed here under the rubric "neutral principles": (a) the insistence on finding the individual interest enshrined as an absolute-,
in other words, as if specifically put in first amendment - like
language-but without the insistence that the natural meaning of the
language of the Constitution yield such individual right;'.. and (b) ,
either failure to examine the state's reason for passing the law or·
dismissal of such interest with a verbal flick of the wrist, incanting
the phrase, "not compelling." These violations teach an attitude toward "rights," even toward the idea of law, that is inimical to demo,;
cracy or any free society-an attitude of thinking of all rights in
terms of uncompromisable absolutes and an attitude that the source
of rights is no consensus but natural justice."'"

alSd;

-see, e.g,, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, (dissenting opinion of
Black, J.) (1959) •
""' Griswold. v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J. dissenting,
characterizing the Connecticut law).
""'The inability to read a general right of privacy into the "natural meaning" of the Bm of Rights apparently caused Justice Goldberg's desperate
resort to the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 3S1 U.S. 479, 487-499
(1965).
141 Whether or not there is "natural justice" or "natural rights" is a metaphysical question not relevant here. For assuming there is "natural justice''
which can be discovered through reason, the question remains: Discovered
through whose reason? The answer is that in a democracy it is discovered through
the reason of the people as manifested in the collective life of the nation. Iri.
a constitutional democracy such "discoveries" are enshrined in words in a cons
stitution or basic resolution of government. In an absolute monarchy, the king
discovers the principles inhering in natural justice through his own reason,
helped, no doubt, by his advisen;, mnch as the people in a democracy are
helped by their leaders, including the Supreme Court. Whether or not one believes in natural justice, there is no way to avoid the question of the human
source of law. Reason is no Mount Sinai. And unless one is an absolute monarch,
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In Griswold, where only the "right" is analyzed, the natural
principle (or at least the commonly imported one) is that the right
is absolute. For, and this may be crux of the error in unprincipled
decisions, we tend to import principle into judicial decisions (i.e.,
we tend to think they are principled just because a court made the
decisions) . The court in Griswold, the inference goes, did not bother
to articulate how it struck the balance for there could be no real
balancing away of this absolute. Moreover, and surely this is the
danger that Justices Black and Stewart were concerned about, the
interest, the right, the liberty or whathaveyou, is not expressed in
words the ''natural meaning'' of which yields "right to marital privacy." This encourages an attitude of seeking, in the name of constitutional rights, judicial vindication of whatever interest seems
paramount to a concerned individual - clean air, clear water,
abortion,"" 25¢ subway fare, etc. - without first generating in the
one cannot sa.y that the natural justice my reason has discovered is the Law
even if most others whom I respect have reached the same conclusion through
their reason. Unfortunately, there are many today who act hKe absolute
monarchs in this respect. The faith of democracy is that if one's "discoveries"
are "true," then one will be able to convince the people to convert them into
positive law. Until that happen&, one's discoveries are not proven and are not
Law. If one does not believe that, he is no democrat. For those who believe in
"natural rights'' and democracy, the statement to which this is a footnote would
more accurately read: "an attitude that the source of 1aw is not popular reason
but rather my reason or the reason of others like me or the reason of the best of
us, some 'natural aristoo:acy.'"
_""' The growing practice of using the "right of privacyn to attack and strike
down abortion laws exemplifes my point. In People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,
458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied 391' U.S. 915- (1970), the California Supreme
Court in obiter dictum that seemed to reassure the majority in a decision holding the "old" California anti-abortion law void for vagueness, declared, in effect,
a constitutional right to abortion, relying mainly on Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035
(D.C.D.Q. 1969) prob. juris. noted - U.S. - (1970) . Then in Ba.bbitz. v. McCavm,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E. D. Wisc. 1970) , a three-judge district court in: W1Sconsin
struck down the Wjsconsin anti-abortion law, eirpressly because it violated the
"right of privacy" of the ninth 3lllendment. What is arresting about these
decisions is the casual way in whjch the courts assume this new "right to
:tbortion" and the utterly cavalier treatment given to the countervailing state
interest. The value promoted by anti-abortion laws is the same as that promoted
?Y anti-euthanasia interpretations of murder laws-human life. Human life
1s so sao:ed that no human being has the right ever to take another's life,
and in the past, abortion was allowed only when the choice was between two
human lives. Moreover, human life is so sacred that the state will not tolerate
any human discretion as to when a piece of protoplasm becomes in fact a
human being: so the limit was. pushed all the way back to conception, the
moment when the pieces of protoplasm become a ruscrete rell that will become
a human being. Ah, "become a human being" there's the rub. For how is it to
determined when the becoming is complete? Is it at conception, three months,
srx. months, birth, one year, four years, seven years? Many answer.. are possible.
Now, I applaud the recent state legislature relaxing the standards for abortion. I
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political marketplace the national consensus necessary to enshrine:
the interest in the Constitution through amendment. And thati
teaches something about basic rights not being consensual, as well
as sapping the persuasive energy necessary to give important inter~'
ests consensual protection. If the idea gets too much at large in this,
country that basic rights, basic law, is not consensual, the spirit ()l{ //'
compromise and the spirit of persuasion wiII be gone and with the.i:Jt · :}';
democracy and free society.
· ··
It should be noted here that I have no quarrel with Mr. Justi(¢/;':)(i
Harlan's approach"" to discovering the meaning of "liberty" in th~::\:}I
due process, clause, for this approach, like Mr. Justice White's
frankly old-fashioned "substantive due process" approach, contain$'
within it both balancing and a deep commitment to the broadly.,!;}
consensual ideal."' Harlan did not seek to find another "right" foJ{'" /
the Bill of Rights panoply-with all that implies in the way of'·
absolutism; no free-floating right to give false hope to those who\·
would skip politics. His focus was on whether or not this particula{Y
Connecticut law violated basic values implicit in a scheme of orderr .
ed liberty as to these litigants such that it could be confidently said;'

:;:l

motiff\
l\

. 1:\

------------------------------.;··· ..,
think a pre-three-man.th-old fetus can safely be defined as ''not a human being,'.'\';;

but I am not sure that it is entirely safe. Might it be a step toward "Brave N¢W:' '
World"? I would at least want to be able to repeal the experiment if it failed._:·;;/
But to declare the option to abort an unquickened fetus a fundamental right is to' '·.
preclude such repeal as well as to fly in the face of history. If the Grisumld opin,, :
ion had. been written in the language of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,. i;
367 U.S. 497, 522, 539-555 (1961), the doctrine under discussion, which presa~'. ·.
a new era of officious judicial intenneddling in the efforts of the People to ,\
solve their problems, would never have gotten started. Item: Harlan, after ten,,,
pages of opinion carefully weighing the countervailing interests, declared, "[bhiJ.. ,
conclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactmen.t •.. [;] no natio~: · ·
. . . has seen fit to effectuate that policy by the means presented here." Id. at"
554-55.l'i. Concerning abortion laws just the opposite is true. (See Section C, bes
low.) Daniel Callahan, in ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY (1970), may,
shed some light on this issue. I have not read the book, but in a review of it ht
Newsweek (June 8. 1970, p. 65) Kenneth Woodward concludes: "His [Callahan'sJ
pointed refusal to sound any trumpets is a mark of the finely tuned morii.l
discrimination that informs this definitive work,"

Poe: 1

r::Ch

~ll~~n:p:i°~.;14~;s;';d(IJ!1)~n
~e1:akC:s~inJs~~!:~!e~~,· · : ·;::::;II[
of his view of the function of judicial review of state action under the four-:
teenth amendment.
""' This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in the
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; ... and so on. It is a rational eontinuum which, broadly speaking,

includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imporitions and purposeless restraints .. . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment,
Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
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that it deprived them of liberty without due process of law.1"" \\That
is the principle in that? The principle is that no law can be arbitrary, lawless, if you will, devoid of reason as it applies to the individual litigants and others like them."" In short, Harlan was saying that
this Connecticut law is clearly unreasonable as applied to these litigants. Unreasonableness implies balancing. Balancing necessitates
weighing competing interests.""'
Striking the balance in the Griswold case called for a painfully
careful inquiry such that a decision to strike down this particular
political act of a co-sovereign was manifestly one that We, the People, in the quiet of our study, knew to be a particularized instance
of our resolved-to precept to be ruled by law, not caprice. The ideal
of "the rule of law" symbolized in the words "due process of law" enshrined in our resolution comes thrillingly to life through such
decision and we are reinforced in our resolve. The process of "ideal"
articulation and teaching remains to be examined in terms of its
effect on the .options in judicial review.

C.
Limits arising as a result of the Sovereignity of We the People.
That the people have an original right to establish,
for their future government, such principles, as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the
basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. . . . The people made the Constitution and the people
can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only
by their will....
The limits on the great power of judicial review adumbrated
in sections A and B could all be ca:lled formal: its institutional
""Id. at 545-555.
"" "Thus the guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna
Carta's 'per legem terrae' and considered as procedural safeguards 'against
executive usurpation and tyranny' have in this country 'become bulwarks also
against arbitrary legislation.'" Id. at 541.
'" Due process has not been reduced to any formula.. . . • The best
that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organixed society. . .. The balance of which I speak
is the balance struck by this Country, having regard to what hjstory
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as wen as the traditions from which it broke Id. at 542.
... Both statements were made by Chief Justice John Marshall: the first
in Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch 137, 175-176 (1803); the second in Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 389 (1821).
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limits as a fact finder and remedy giver; as a coequal branch o[
government and law interpreter, as a non-political branch above, ,'
the storm of partisan and factional strife. True, these import limitations on the nature of the substantive law declared and thus on the
constitutional ideal articulated but that is only incidental to the
limitation. The limit I now speak of is a direct limitation on the
substantive constitutional law that can legitimately (and, ultimately, effectively) be promulgated by the Court. That limitation comes
from the fact that the People are sovereign in a democracy and that
the Constitution is ultimately what the People say it is. From this
flow two closely related substantive limitations on the power of the
Court to announce controlling constitutional principles. One, the
principle has to be rooted in broadly shared ideals - ideals, admittedly held at a high level of abstraction but which are nonetheless
deeply felt. Two, the principle must not violate the "commonsense·
of humanity."
Roscoe Pound asserted that it is "appeal to the conscience of
the citizen, appeal to his reason, [which is] the foundation of the
authority of the legal order and so of the precepts of a body of law.
Habits of obedience give way unless they have this support in reason."'"' This is of paramount importance in articulating the fundamental law - the People's Resolution. Appeal to the People's conscience, the Pec:>ple's reason, is appeal to; m.an "in the quiet of his
study." But is there enough stuff there to actually guide judgment
to constitutional decisions that are "at once widely acceptable and
morally elevating . . ."'"" - those decisions that are "an occasion
for dancing in the street."
To examine this "stuff" of value and reason, I have artifically
separated the ideas for analysis into "consensual ideals" and "the
common sense of humanity."
(1) Consensual Ideals.
How does one identify Lliat vague, unarticulated ideal held
with abiding c.onviction, which being part of "the nation's conscience," will cause the nation, "on sober second thought," to realize
that the governmental act struck down was wrong - in short, that
it was unconstitutionalr Mr. Justice Frankfurter helps us toward
the answer. "[TJ he inescapable judicial task in giving substantive
content, legally enforced, to the Due Process Claus,e ... must rest,"
,.. R. POUNJ:>, THE FORMAU\>E ERA OF AMERI~N LA.w, at 28 (1938).

, .. Bickel, supra note 3, at 243.

L
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he said, "on fundamental presuppositions ro-oted in history to
which widespre·ad acceptance may fairly be attributed.""'' Professor
Bickel after quoting the above says:
Fundamental presuppositions are not merely to be
alluded to ... or even merely intoned, but are to be traced
and evaluated from the roots up, their validity in changing
material and other conditions convincingly demonstrated,
and their application to particular facts carried to the last
decimal . . . Only through this effort, prescribed by this
craft, can the conscientious judge himself be assured that
he is not at sea, buffeted by the wavelets of his personal pre.
dilections. And only thus can he hope for the ultimate
assent of those whom otherwise he governs irresponsibily.'..

Of course, this process, or something closely akin to it, of finding "fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed," applies as well to determining the seemingly more precise precepts of the Bill of Rights.
But Mr. Justice Black objects to all of this. In Adamson v. California he concluded:
This process [ of striking down legislative enactments
which violate the ConstitutionJ, of course, involves interpretation, and since words can have many meanings, interpretation obviously may result in contraction or extension
of the original purpase of the constitutional provision,
thereby affecting policy. But to pass upan the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because
of ·application of "natural law" deemed to be above and
undefined by the Constitution is another. "In the one instance, courts proceeding within dearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute palicies written into
the Constitution; in the other, they roam at will in the
limjtless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and
actually select policies, a respansibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the
people"'""
Black's indictment includes two interdependent premises which
should be more closely examined, i.e.; that interpreting the Bill of
Rights is a diffeTen.t kind of thing than interpreting the "due pro'"'- Sweezy v. New Hampshire, !154 U.S. 234, 255, 267 (1957) (emphasis added).
""'Bickel, supra note 3, at 236-237 (emphasis added) .
'-"" 332 U.S. 46, 68, 90·91 (1947).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss4/4

58

McLaughlin: What Has the Supreme Court Taught, Part II

384

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

cess" or, implicitly, the "equal protection" clause; and that the
"Palko-Adamson", "Cardozo-Frankfurter" approach to the fourteenth amendment is the importation of "natural law" deemed to
be above the Constitution, leaving Judges "to the limitless area of
their own beliefs." I think it not too presumptuous first to inquire
why Justice Black might feel impelled to such premises - and then
to examine their validity. Justice Black came to the Supreme Court
in the wake of the storm over the "New Deal-vetoing" Court and he
came directly from the Senate where he had championed much of
the New Deal legislative program. The judicial veto was exercised
in the name of due process, a practice begun in the late nineteenth
century of judicial examination of the substance of a legislative
enactment to determine if it unreasonably interf6-ed with a right
subsumed in the word "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment. At
first the focus was on the "rights" in "liberty" but such rights were
imported quite casually, without examination of their societal fundamentalness. The focus shifted gradually to the reasonableness of
the legislation, as in the classic formulation of "substantive due process" by Chief Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.JI;<
Roscue Pound, speaking in.1936, said:
Discredit of natural law in this generation is due chiefly to its effects in our constitutional law. In the last of its
phases it lead to a notion of the Constitution as declaratory
of natural law and so of an ideal of the common law as in
its main lines and characteristic doctrines an embodiment
of universal precepts running back of all constitutions.
Thus certain common-law doctrines and traditionally
received ideals of the profession [ such as "freedom of contract" and "fault"] were made into a super-constitution by
which the social legislation of the last decade of the nineteenth. century and of the first third of the present century
.
was to be judged:""
This natural law theory of constitutional rights was attacked
with the weapons of epistemology and psychology from Kant
through Freud and beyond to Skinner and Watson. In that same
lecture referred to above, Pou.nd said:
"A psychological realism is abroad which regards
reason as affording no more than a cover illusion for pro,.. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937): "[Rlegulation which is reasonable in relation to
its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process."
"""Pound, supra note 149, at 26-27.
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cesses judicial and administrative which are fundamentally
and necessarily unrational.'"
00

Thus Black, anned with the assumptions of the new realism
(although certainly not an articulator of that philosophy) , attacked
that which had frustrated his own efforts in the Senate to bring
about social and economic reform. But Black was also concerned
with "democratic" and "human" values. He was able to reconcile
his seeming dilenuna (choice between natural rights and not
enforcing "preferred liberties" on state action) by fastening on the
admittedly more code-like Bill of Rights and evolving a theory based
on historical evidence that the original framets of the fourteenth
amendment intended through its general provision to make the Bill
of Rights applicable to the states."" Thus he could have his cake,
or most of it, and eat it too; for the Bill of Rights (coupled with the
fifteenth amendment) on a reasonable intetpretation protect most
of the "preferred liberties". But his abhorance of the "natural
rights" theory moved him to see the Bill of Rights as more codelike in precision (e.g. like the U.C.C. or Bankruptcy Act) than any
other Supretne Court judge or professional commentator has ever
seen it. Anyone who has ever struggled to give precise content to
such phrases as "freedom of speech" or "establishment of religion"
in order to apply thetn to a particular set of facts realizes they are
neither yardstick, slide rule, nor pharmaceutical prescription. The
Bill of Rights mentions no freedom of association ("assembly" is far
from "association") , yet few have found difficulty in seeing it as
implicit in the ideal symbolized by "freedom of speech" - including
Mr. Justice Black. The words "bill of attainder" have historically
a most precise meaning, yet Mr. Justice Black was willing to have
them cover a situation which clearly their "plain meaning" did
not cover.1.SS That there is a "plain meaning" or "precise boundaries"
in the Bill of Rights which obviates definition, interpretation, or
judgetnent is pure illusion - benign illusion if the "plain meaning"
of today comports with one's own ideal; but baleful illusion when
tom?rrow's judge sees a new "plain meaning". For, as Professor
Bickel points out, viewing words in a constitution as absolutes both
stifles needed change with changing conditions and hides the
Id. at 'l:/.
Adamson v. Califorlnia. 332 U.S. 46 92-12.3 (1947) Black J. dissentingAppendix .
1113
•
See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 3_63 U.S. 603, 621, 622 (1963) and compare
with discuss.ion of bills of attainder in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
318, 321-24 (1946) (concurring opinion by Frank!mter J.).
lfill
l6'r
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process of definition that inevitably goes on.""" The former does not
comport with the viability of constitutions, and the latter etiminates
the very process judges are most valued for, the articulation of the
.reasons for the judgment of what is "the law of the case".
But if the process of discovering the particular application of a
constitutional ideal, including the ideals of the Bill of Rights,
requires particularized judgment with no absolute guide to be
found solely in the written Constitution or its history are we left
then in the "limitless area of the judges' own beliefs"? Of course,
the answer that Cardozo and Frankfurter and Pound gave was an
emphatic "no". The judge must find the answer in as dispassionate
and objective a search into the nation's culture, its history and traditions, as is possible, while still recognizing that even at best prepossessions color the vision. To turn to Professor Bickel again:
"The function of the Justices ... is to immerse themselves in the tradition of our society of kindred societies
that have gone before, in history and in the sediment of history which is law, and, as Judge Hand once suggested, in
the thought and vision of the philosophers and the poets ..
The Justices will then be fit to extract fundamental presuppositions from their deepest selves, but in fact from the
envolving morality of our tradition ... " 100
And to hold the discovered ideal gingerly, warily; distrustful
one's own vision, seeking myriad concrete signs that it is that to
which "widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed"-signs in
the common law of the states, in their legislation, and so forth.
One "knows", for example, that the right to confront the witnesses
against one in a criminal trial participated in the ideal called "due
process of law", held with deep conviction, because it has deep roots
in the common law of evidence, j.s uniformly the rule in the states
and is enshrined in the Bill of Rights.""} The "rtight to travel" ,is
found nowhere expressly stated in the Constitution, but are not the
Constitution, our history and traditions pregnant with its implication? But they nowhere tell us it is absolute.
On the other hand, is the ideal, freedom of religion, violated
by a state promulgated prayer for school children which says in
essence ''In God We Trust?" Assume further that the child is
"forced" to entone such prayer, not by law, but by the same kind
""'Bickel, supra note 3, at 96-97.
,.. Id. at 236.

""See Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400 (1965).
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of social pressure that causes a businessman to wear a suit and tie.
a college student to join a social club, a woman to look her best,
a little boy to pretend to hate little girls, a judge to be sober. Is
there anything in our history, culture and traditions that tells one
that widespread acceptance can fairly be attributed to the idea of
the outlawing of such a prayer by invoking the "freedom of religion"? What is there in the culture of "a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being""'" that tells one that the
People, on sober second thought in the quiet of their study, when
musing with their conscience, will soon realize that such a prayer,
so compelled, violates their resolution to freedom of religion? Does
not such a blind reading of our society not teach the People something that is very pernicious indeed? That it is not their Constitution after all? That the Constitution is something alien? That the
Constitution is what nine judges say it is, nothing more or less?
That the Constitution does not em.body their fundamental precepts of the good society? Or does it teach that minority rights are
sacred no matter what the push of the majority? And is even that
an entirely benign lesson? I suggest that the Constitution is too
deeply embedded a symbol of nationhood and of the free people we
are resolved to be to be shaken much by the prayer cases.'68 Rather the
Court is the loser, in prestige and in confidence. Its role as teacher
of the fundamental ideals of democracy and freedom felt to be enshrined in the Constitution was severly damaged.
The prayer cases are only the most glaring example of the
Court's failing to keep within the legitimate bounds of judicial
review. Paradoxically the prayer cases fulfill the dire prophecy of
both those who fear the natural rights reading of the Constitution
and those who fear the absolutists.

Tne "Common Sense of Humanity."
While the framing of ideals focuses on fundamental values,
their particular application focuses on rationality - what I ·have
called the common sense of humanity. They are not really separable
but caii be examined separately. For instance, the framing of ideals
by the Supreme Court is done in the particularized setting of cases.
(2)

,.. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (opinion for tbe Court per
Douglas J .) .
""'Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203. (1963). The prayer which was the subject of Engel v. Vitale read:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.''
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The general framing of the ideal is done by the Constitution itself.
What the Court adds is the application of that abstract value to real
life and shows how individuals and society are concretely affected.
This brings the abstraction to life, makes it breathe. A living, breathing ideal that is felt to participate in the ideal that thrills and,
thus, thrills anew, thereby· reinforces the conviction and teaches
the ideal. A good bit of the determination of whether or not the
particular application will actually have this effect is whether or
not it appears reasonable. If the ideal is invoked in a setting that
seems to violate common sense then not only will it not have the
effect of reinforcing the deeply felt conviction to the ideal, it will
have the opposite effect.
For example, in the case of Mapp v. Ohio,'.. the conduct of the
police, which was the subject of the appeal, was, to say the least,
enough to shock-the-conscience of most Americans. But instead
of invoking the ideal of fundamental fairness, fairly implicit in
due process, the Court invoked the ideal of privacy ~ or as more
familiarly recognized "a man's home is his castle." There is little
question that the latter is "a fundamental presupposition, :rooted
in history, to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed."
Nor was there much question that _this ideal was not lived up to
when the police invaded Mrs. Mapp's home. Nonetheless, no one
thought to brief this point, as the precedents (and I think comillon
sense) told the attorneys that the Court had no remedy for such
violation available to it. Nonetheless the Court found a remedy,
and declared that henceforth evidence gathered, no matter how
incriminating, by violating the fourth amendment ''right of
privacy" was to be excluded from any subsequent trial. The reasoning was this: the right of privacy is of paramount importance; this
right is frequently violated by the police; the states have provided
no effective remedy to redress such wrong or deter its occurence;
the Court will therefore use the only remedy it has and exclude
the evidence from trial. This will of course preclude the state from
having a fair chance of conviction but it will, reasoned the Court,
have the outweighing salutory effect of detering the police from
violating the right of privacy of innocent folk who have no effective
personal remedy. It has this deterrent effect because the police,
zealous ,to get people actually convicted and not just arrested
awhile, will not do things to hurt their chances. About half the
• 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

-....-------------------~
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states had a similai· rule based on similar reasoning - as did the
federal government. Of course, half the states did not have such a
rule and some prominent jurists have felt it a rather silly remedy for
an admittedly worrisome problem.""'
The exclusionary rule, which uses the rules of evidence for an
end incompatible with their truth.finding function, only makes
sense, even on its own terms, if it can be demonstrated that it will,
in fact, deter the invasion of the rights of innocent members of the.
public by the police. Moreover, it can only be reasonable if such
deterrence is greater than the loss in effectiveness of the criminal
law in detering the invasion of the rights of innocent members of
the public by other members of the public. Striking the balance
would require a factual investigation entirely beyond the means of
a court of law. But least, the Court's premises for its deduction of
deterrence can be examined. In the first place for a proscriptive
rule to be effective and fair it must give sufficient guidelines to
the potential violator that he can know what conduct is expected of
him. There is certainly no precision inherent in the fourth amendment language (freedom from "unreasonable searches"} and ~ery
little has been added by judicial gloss.'.. Moreover the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule is predicated on the premise that
the aim of police work is to obtain convictions of the guilty.
Ideally, this is the ultimate aim for the police, although for the
criminal law itself the ultimate aim is to prevent crime and insure
order. This ultimate aim of the law is often obtained by the police
in ways short of obtaining a conviction. The local police officer is of.
ten called a "peace officer" and for good reason. He regularly breaks
up fights, quells disturbances, and quiets the apprehensions of the
neighborhood by arresting "suspicious persons" or telling them to
move on. In short, he is a direct agent of the community for maintaining order, extrajudicially. Moreover, he sometimes must act
fast to remove a perceived source of danger, though this perception
is grounded in inarticulate intuition . i.e. a sixth sense gathered
from experience and training. If he "knows" there is imminent danger of crime or a cache of dangerous contraband (e.g. drugs) soon
to be removed, and also realizes he does not have probable

at

,.. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 24-2 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.. 585, cert. denied 270 U.S.
657 (1926) (opinion by Cardozo J. with the fa1nous "constable blundered"
l~e); Friendly, supra note 57, at 260·262.
,.. See Bums, Mapp v. Ohio; An
All-American Mistake,
19 DE PAUL L. R.Ev.
80 (1969).
;
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cause (i.e. he will later be unable to articulate the various sensations that make him "know", so as to make an absent person believe
he "knew") he will nonetheless usually opt for immediate intrusion
because his real aim is to keep the peace, here and now, and to
prevent crime - the ultimate aim of the law anyhow. The loss of a
later conviction will disappoint him but not dissuade him from
repeating his conduct. Thus the premise of the Supreme Court in
Mapp, that the exclusionary rule will remove "the incentive,
[convictions], to disregard [fourth amendment] rights" is largely
false. The peace officer's "incentive" is not "convictions", rather it
is to prevent crime and maintain order.
The Court's reference to the F .Bl. experience with the exclusionary rule as bland assurance that it will not hamper effective
law enforcement does not make good sense.'•• The F.B.I. has a
different character and function from local police. The F.B.I. is an
elite force, whose training and skill prepare them to deal with
sophisticated standards in an articulate manner. Moreover, their
function is almost solely to gain convictions. They are usually
called in to investigate a particular crime or episode after it is over.
They walk no beats, patrol no neighborhoods, etc.'..
This analysis shows at the least that there should have been
substantial doubts as to whether or not the exclusionary rule of
Mapp made good sense, even 9n its own terms. Add to this the
problematical nature of the "deter police, Joss of deterrence of
crime" equation,- and the rule, as a nearly immutable, funda••• Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961).
"'"It should _also be noted tba.t applying the rule to federal agents a1so
makes more sense because they have, and regularly employ, sophisticated methods
of intrusion, such as electronic eavesdropping devices, which have about them
the spectre of 1984. This is especially true when thaie· devices are used "official·
ly" as deliberate policy by high government officers. For example, see United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 640 (2nd Cir. 1950) (opinion by Learned Hand
J.); cf. Omstead v. United States, Zl7 U.S. 438 (1926) (dissenting opinion per.
Brandeis J.) •
""IN LAW AND ORDER. R=NS1D!£RED, A S'rAFF·REJ>ORT TO 'IHE NATIONAL CoM·
MIS!ll'ON ON THE CA.USES AND l'REvENTrON OF VIOLENCE, Oh.ap. 17, "Securing Police
Compliance with Constitutional Limitations: The F.xclusionary Rule and Other
Device11," prepared by Dean Paulsen, Professors Whitebread and Bonnie
(1969) . While strongly in favor of the exclusionary rule, it is admitted therein
that "Iwlhether the exclusionary rule actually does effectively deter the police
is a question without a firm answer. No solid research has put the issue to rest."
But there is one defense of the rule made in the article that is solidly credible:
"We know that the rise and expansion of the exclusionary rule has been acw.mpanied by many efforts at police education." This ·report suggests several other
remedies for police illegality (none of which has been often implemented) and
suggests further that the best remedy would be a "hybrid of the ombudsman and
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mental rule, i& likely to offend the public's common sense. Tack onto this the different vantage point from which the public views
crime and enforcement, and, it becomes well· nigh certain that
the Mapp rule would offend the common sense· of tlie _great
majority. For thtoug~ the news media (the public's_ eyes and
ears} the public sees the crime and its details, and not the details
of apprehension and arrest. The courts and especially the Supreme
Court see the record of the trial court with its focus, in this context,
on apprehension and arrest. I have read eno:ugh records to know
that the "constable often blunders" and often in a most egregious
way. Moreover, the process of review culls out the worst examples
for the Court's close attention. One must take into account too the
likelihood that the· general public live in private circumstances, in
the main, much less free from crime than an upper middle· class
judge. Thus the average citizen feels much more threatened by
private crime than by official crime. And the latter, even when
aggravated, is much less violative of his personal integrity (his
"privacy" if you· will) , than, rape, murder, robbery, burglary, assault. etc.
In short, to most of the public the "right of privacy" is felt to
be threatened much more by "criminals" than by peace officers.
The Court should have preceived this. "[J]udges must have something of the creative artist in them; they must have antennae registering feelings and judgment beyond logical, let alone quantitative,
proo£""'•
The Court labors from afar, so it can perceive with dispassion
the intimate workings of society. But it cannot be blind to how its
view from such a distance can distort its vision of society. It must
immerse itself in society's perceptions as well as its history. and traditions in order to plumb the common sense of its humanity.
And what is the "common sense of humanity" and why is it
important? There is-no wholly articulate answer. The late Howard
Lowry said:
the extttnal review agency." (Pp. 393-3%.) But such programs that promise
genuine control of polioe illegality have had rough political sledding. I suggest
that the gross unpopularity of the exclusionary rule bas greatly hurt political
efforts at reform. The police advertise themselves as victimized and hamstrung
by "bleeding heart liberals," who imposed the exclusionaary rule on them.
Since,_ as pointed out, the ex:clusionary rule does not make good sense to the average man, the police argument is credible, Any other reform is tarred with the
same brush of softness on crime and thereby doomed to· defeat.
-·
,.. F. Frankfurter quoted in Bickel, supra note 3, at 239.
·
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What makes for living ideas, ideas really adequate for
life? How can we increase our chance of having them?
We can do this in many ways - first of all, by relating the
ideas we do have to the common sense of humanity._ For the
common sense of humanity, whatever its faults may be, has
a deep regard for ultimate fact: For that matter, it has a
deep regard for education. It does not join in the· vicious
anti-intellectualism of our time. But it does not lightly
suffer educated fools. It has disdain for posturing and conceit. It does not wish to be taken in. It can be temporarily
fooled and follow many a vain show, but it has a built-in
capacity for returning to what is so. It has its own salty test
for truth. The lanky old fellow in "Abe Martin's" drawings used to remark that when you hear a fellow say that it
isn't the money but the principle of the thing, "it's the
money." Some sense of this deep human reservoir informed
the idealism of Emerson. This is why he preferred the true
scholar or Man Thinking to the book-worm-the pedant,
the art-for-art's-sake aesthete, or the professional highbrow,
whom A. P. Herbert once defined as "the person who looks
at a sausage and thinks of Picasso." The true scholar, says
Emerson, "loses. no hour which the man lives.'",..

'

..

When common sense man sees a guilty man go free, he seesf \
a criminal let loose. He wonders, "What are trials for if not fot:i' C
seeking truth?" He sees an example for other potential malefactot;t' .>
that says, "even if you are caught for crime, you may go unchastenetl:f <
unrehabilitated, unbanished-let loose possibly. to prey on me.''
you ask him, "what of the abuses of power, the official violatiqij°'_ /
of rights of innocent citizens?" He will answer, "punish the violatoiL)
banish him, and redress the 'wrong to the innocent!" I£ you prote/f i
that even the guilty were presumed innocent when the violatitld~ ·?: .
occurred, he will reply, "Hindsight shows us the presumption w~~, PI
wrong-though the presuming was not-besides if his right ought t~, /)
be vindicated, punish the police, not the public." If you protest thii'.t ::/
courts have no smaller whip but exclusion with which two pmi.islf :/
he will reply, "Then go to someone else."
Other exclusionary rules fashioned by the Court to serve enqf)
other than truth-finding are somewhat less violative of comm9ji;_ ·
sense but, on the other hand, seem to vindicate rights less deeplj; ·
imbedded in constitutional ideals. The right not "to be a witne$t
against himself" was bolstered in Miranda v. Arizona,"" by conjoi~;;e

it/•

i :)

" 1 1.owry, supra note 31, at 114-115.
· ·,;:,
"" 384 U.S. 4.36 (1966). See Friendly, supra note 57, at 266, A Postscript-·@..
Miranda.
· ·
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ing it with the right of privacy and the right to counsel. But these
cases seemed to strongly reinforce the.example of the Court's setting
the apparently guilty free in the name of "constitutional rights" an example serving, in the public view, more to belittle the name
"constitutional rights" than to reinforce the ideal from which the
rights extend.
But there is a subtler lesson taught by the example of the
Court's persistence in enshrining as constitutional immutables that
to which "wide spread acceptance can not fairly be attributed".
For, "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women", and "[n]o
constitution ... no court can save it," admonished Leamed Hand.''"'
The Constitution is, however, the external deposit of the spirit of
liberty. And by interpretation of that Constitution, that spirit can
be nourished. And what is that spirit? Learned Hand best epitomized
it as the "spirit of moderation." "It is the temper which does not
press· a partisan advantage to its bitter end, which can understand
and will respect the other side, which feels a unity between all
citizens... which recognizes their common fate and their common
aspiration - in a word, which has faith in the sacredness of the
individual."'" It is "the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right."m
It is not the spirit that makes "non-negotiable demands" no
matter how righteous the cause is felt to be. It is not the spirit that
in the name of a righteous cause would bypass the market place of
deinocratic persuasion and coerce a result in spite of, indeed absolutely not concerned with, the wishes of the majority. And this
spirit of "immoderation" is abroad today among a small but very
important segment of our people.
It is always the temptation of those whose work focuses very
closely on one person, group or institution to exaggerate their
subject's importance in causing whatever joys or sorrows they think
beset the world. But one has to wonder whether the Supreme
Court's example has not fostered the "spirit of immoderation."
Providing an ever-expanding forum for the decision of public disputes where the will of the majority is not considered; announcing
m Hand, "The Spirit of liberty," in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY ADDRESSES OF LEAJlNED HAND, at 143-144 (1959) .

PAPERS AND

"• Hand, "The Contributions of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization",
supra note 173, at 125.
,
"' Hand, "The Spirit of Liberty"', 5upra note 173, at 144. This was said of
the "spirit of liberty," but t.o Hand the spirit of liberty and the spirit of
moderation were one and the same.
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in terms as absolutes, rights that are still fairly debated in societt§:
protecting rights in ways that offoncl the common sense of practic~t;
men-surely these lessons do not encourage a spirit that seeks t6:
persuade in the democratic arena; or a spirit that holds its trutfoi
tentatively, willing to listen, to be persuaded, to compromise; Q~r
a spirit willing to make practical adjustments, halting steps, Wi'llt$\
ingly restrained in the pursuit of ideals.
.
Persuasion and compromise are the only absolutes necessary>t\!i: •·•·•·
democracy. Willingness to try patiently to persuade others of tho$e · ·
matters we are most convinced of, and holding action in abeyanc~
until the "convincing" forms a political majority, that is the spir:fa. ·...· ·
essential to democracy. The Court has often not acted in that spirii ·
and the Court is our great teacher.
·" ·

m.
CoNCLUSION

This has been a criticism of the performance by the Supre))li:: . i ;
Court of its vital role as "teacher to the citizenry." Therefore it haf /
focused on what I think are shortcomings-and although I thi4\ /•
they are valid and important shortcomings, they are not the who!~ \. ·
picture. Much of what the Court has done has been within tJ¥; <
bounds of legitimate judicial review-much has been "at once wid¢l,j i
acceptable and morally elevating." The ideals of equal treatr:n.e@l <
for all, of a broad and equal suffrage, of an open forum for all ideal
have been 'Steadfastly taught.
....• ···....·
But the shortcomings are too glaring to go unnoticed, or foJ' ·
long, uncorrected. These shortcomings. not only teach coun.tet'r
democratic habits, but the Court by losing prestige is less potent tt( <
teach constitutional lessons. And they will be largely corrected if }
our system is essentially healthy, and it is. The change that rrp;iiff ii
and will occur is not a return to something once held and now Io·t,f<
The Court has never in its 180 year history stayed very long with}I'I.
the limits outlined. here to describe its legitimate role. The prestige ·.
of courts and especially of the Supreme Court in the Americ.in, ·•
tradition is too strong for the judges to resist the use of their aw1
parent power for very long. But if the teachings and spirit of thff
great judges of the recent past-Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone_,;'·
Hand and Frankfurter-were more closely heeded, a better
spective of the Court's real power would be gained, and the ternpta"'.
tion to use the seemingly greater power resisted.
·
· '

pett
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A few, more specific, suggestions can be made as to what might
be done in the near future to bring about this adjustment-some
of the suggestions are merely predictions of what will be done. Most
specifically the Court could (1) overrule Mapp v. Ohio;"" (2)
modify and limit Miranda v. Arizona;m and (3) limit the prayer
· ,cases."" Mapp v. Ohio was clearly experimental. It was also clearly
legislative. Thus, like experimental legislation which has failed or
which later wisdom tells us was misconceived in the first place, it
should be overruled. Mr. Justice Brandeis' words are especially
appropriate here: "[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution,
where correction through legislative action is practically impossible,
this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning,
recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."'""
Of course, with reference t_o Mapp v. Ohio, special care need be
ta).<.en to avoid seeming to give the police license to ignore the fourth
;;i.mendment. Per1?-aps it should be overruled in a case where the
local authority has adopted other effective means of curbing police
lawlessness. Dicta in preliminary cases might suggest this possibility
and· thus have the additional salutory effect of encouraging such
adoption. Miranda v. Arizona might be similarly limited and
modified in a case where the palice have adopted some other safeguards to the integrity of pre-trial interrogation. An invitation,
through dictum, to the same end might be made concerning In re
Gault.''"
The prayer cases might be limited by taking in a case where
the prayer is frankly teacher-initiated and then upholding the
teacher's action. If this had been done in a companion case with
Engel v. Vitale'-"' one ventures to guess that all the criticism and
<1,ttendant loss of prestige could have been avoided. Since it was the
ttmdency to establishmen.tarianism that the Court sought to nip in
t.he bud in Engel> it is clearly a matter of degree and the line between
sufficient . and insufficent tendency can be rationally drawn between school board and teacher initiation.
""367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
.
'"Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, (1962) and Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
""Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 4-06-8 (1932) . See
also, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-6 (1944).
100 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
""370 U.S. 421 (Hl62).
1
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The suggestion of limiting the prayer cases by a holding on the
other side suggests a general way in which the Court could improve
its performance. This is by a sort of "ping-pong" method of drawing
constitutional lines. Since most of the Court's decisional rhetoric
goes unconsumed by the general public and is often ambiguous.
anyway, whereas its holdings are headlined and unequivocal, the . 2
best way to limit a holding is with another holding. Thus if the
constitutional line is figuratively an invisible net, its approximate
location can be best indicated by holdings bouncing first on one
side, then on the other, each getting progressively closer to the unseen net, to the point, hopefully, that one can actually "see", even
"feel", the "net".
Another more general suggestion is the return to frank subs
stantive due process standards for reviewing the validity of state
substantive law. Thus, the Court could review "uncommonly
silly laws" without the dangerous teaching of the Griswold rhetork
Of course, the lesson of abuse of the due process standard in the
first third of this century must not be forgotten, and will not be, if the
limitations inherent in the Court's being "a Court of law" are o~
served. (See Section A, supra) . Mr. Justice White's opinions presage such reform. Moreover, Thayer's rule of the "dear mistake;'
should become the principle by which "hard cases" are reversed.""
Finally, the Court should decide most questions as to whether
or not it will exercise its great power of judicial review in terms of
jurisdiction, never forgetting that issues of "concreteness" (i.e.
standing in the "impure" or non-constitutional sense, ripeness, and
mootness) can give a legitimate reason for temporary avoidance,
but not for either permanent avoidance or discretionary interven·
tion.

•••••

It is hoped that this discussion has not been read as a psalm
for conservatism, but as a hymn to liberal democracy and to the
Court's great and continuing role as the principal teacher-guardian
of its basic precepts. Our Constitution is a great bible of liberty but
it is no manifesto for change. It must be made relevant for each era,
but should reflect rather than initiate evolving fundamental ideals.
Most constitutional issues that directly affect individuals in our
society ultimately reach the Court because of our tradition of
channeling the awful power of state coercion through the judiciary.
"" See Bickel, supra note 3, at 35-46; Friendly, note 57, at 263-265.
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Thus, the Court is the primary guardian of constitutional ideals for
the short run. On the other hand, it is the primary teacher of its
ideals for the long run. In order to remain that great teacher it
must become the true scholar. Learned Hand surely sensed this,
though he would deny the primacy of the Court's teacher-rule; his
·exhortation to the scholar rings true for the Court:
I am thinking of what the scholar imposes upon himself; of those abnegations which are the condition of his
preserving the serenity in which alone he can work; I am
thinking· of his aloofness from burning issues, which is
hard for generous and passionate natures, but without
which they almost inevitably become advocates, agitators,
crusaders, and propagandists.
You may take Martin Luther or Erasmus for your
model, but you cannot play both roles at once; you may
not carry a sword beneath a scholar's gown, or lead flaming
causes from a cloister. . . . I am satisfied .that a scholar
who tries to combine these parts sells his birthright for a
mess of pottage; that when the final count is made, it will
be found that the impairment of his powers far outweights
any possible contribution to the ~auses he has espoused. If
he is fit to serve in his calling at all, it is because he has
learned to serve in no other, for his singleness of mind
quickly evaporates in the fires of passions, however holy.'..

108

Hand, "On Receiving an Honorary Degx,ee," supra note 173, at 105.
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